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Abstract
We revisit the issue of epistemological and semantic foundations for autoepistemic and default
logics, two leading formalisms in nonmonotonic reasoning. We develop a general semantic approach
to autoepistemic and default logics that is based on the notion of a belief pair and that exploits the
lattice structure of the collection of all belief pairs. For each logic, we introduce a monotone operator
on the lattice of belief pairs. We then show that a whole family of semantics can be defined in a
systematic and principled way in terms of fixpoints of this operator (or as fixpoints of certain closely
related operators). Our approach elucidates fundamental constructive principles in which agents form
their belief sets, and leads to approximation semantics for autoepistemic and default logics. It also
allows us to establish a precise one-to-one correspondence between the family of semantics for
default logic and the family of semantics for autoepistemic logic. The correspondence exploits the
modal interpretation of a default proposed by Konolige. Our results establish conclusively that default
logic can be viewed as a fragment of autoepistemic logic, a result that has been long anticipated. At
the same time, they explain the source of the difficulty to formally relate the semantics of default
extensions by Reiter and autoepistemic expansions by Moore. These two semantics occupy different
locations in the corresponding families of semantics for default and autoepistemic logics.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of epistemological and semantic
foundations of default and autoepistemic logics. We identify some basic common principles
behind these two formalisms and state them in terms of lattices of possible-world structures
and belief pairs, operators on these lattices and fixpoints of these operators. We use
these principles to develop a comprehensive unified semantic treatment of default and
autoepistemic logics. The approach we propose helps explain how agents form their belief
sets. It allows us to study constructive ways in which belief sets can be approximated and
leads to a comprehensive and precise account of the relationship between the two logics in
question.
The default logic introduced by Reiter [28] and the autoepistemic logic introduced by
Moore [24,25] are among the most widely studied nonmonotonic knowledge representa-
tion systems. Research monographs [1,3,21] provide extensive presentations of these two
logics, and of their properties. The default and the autoepistemic logics were designed to
model commonsense forms of reasoning, in particular, reasoning patterns of the form “in
the absence of any information to the contrary infer . . .”. Such patterns were seen as a basic
reasoning mechanism in the context of partial knowledge. Reiter referred to such patterns
as defaults.
In the default logic of Reiter, a default is represented as a non-standard inference rule
α :Mβ1, . . . ,Mβk
γ
,
where α, βi , 1  i  k, and γ are propositional formulas (we limit our attention to the
propositional case only). Speaking informally, the intended meaning of a default is: if
α can be derived and if for every i , 1  i  k, βi is consistent, then derive γ . This
intuition points to the key idea behind a default. It has premises of two different types.
The premise α is called the prerequisite of a default and is treated just like premises of
standard (monotone) inference rules. Premises βi are called justifications. The symbol
M that prefixes justifications is commonly used in modal logic to denote the modality
of “being consistent”. Reiter used it to emphasize the way in which justifications are
interpreted. In order to apply the rule, they just need to be consistent (rather than derived).
To formally define the semantics of default logic, Reiter provided a precise mathematical
interpretation for the phrases “α can be derived” and “βi is consistent” and defined the
notion of an extension as a formal representation of a belief set that an agent might adopt
when reasoning on the basis of a default theory.
Though Reiter used the modal notation Mβ for justifications to emphasize the intended
meaning of justifications, he did not use the syntax of modal logic nor the semantic
techniques developed there. In fact, in current literature dealing with default logic, the letter
M is dropped from the notation of justifications. We will also do so throughout the paper.
The idea to use a modal language and modal logic techniques in the area of nonmonotonic
logics is due to McDermott and Doyle [22,23]. For the primary modality in the language
they chose the modality of consistency which, as we mentioned earlier, is commonly
denoted by M . McDermott and Doyle [23] and, later, McDermott [22] introduced several
nonmonotonic semantics for the operator M . They suggested that an inference rule of the
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form “infer γ if in the absence of any information contradicting β” should be represented
by the modal formula Mβ⇒ γ .
Moore [25] developed autoepistemic logic departing from the nonmonotonic logics of
McDermott and Doyle. Moore pointed out some technical problems arising in the context
of the original modal nonmonotonic logic described in [23], observing that the notion of
consistency proposed there was too weak. He also discarded a more refined approach from
[22], where modal nonmonotonic logics based on monotone modal systems T, S4 and
S5 were studied. Moore suggested to use the modality of belief as the primary modality
in the language. This modality is usually denoted by K and is related to M through the
identity M = ¬K¬. Further, and more importantly, Moore suggested that the semantics
of a modal nonmonotonic logic be designed so that to model reasoning of a rational agent
reflecting on her own beliefs. Moore postulated that such a rational agent should have
perfect introspection capabilities. That is, if ϕ is in the agent’s belief set then Kϕ should
be a belief too (the agent believes in her own beliefs) and if ϕ is not in the agent’s belief
set then ¬Kϕ should be in the belief set (the agent disbelieves her non-beliefs). Moore
proposed a way to complete collections of base facts about the world (possibly referring
to agent’s beliefs or disbeliefs) to belief sets, called expansions, that the agent might hold
given the base theory.
This brief overview points to similarities in motivations and intuitions behind default
and autoepistemic logics. These similarities drew attention to the issue of a formal account
of the relationship between the two logics, which quickly became a subject of active
research. Konolige [16] proposed to translate a default
α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
,
into the autoepistemic formula:
Kα ∧¬K¬β1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬K¬βk → γ.
The translation was an attempt to reflect the intuition that in order to apply a default,
its prerequisite must be derived and its justifications must be consistent. To model the
statement “α is derived”, Konolige used the formula Kα. To model the statement that “βi
are consistent”, Konolige used the formula ¬K¬βi (which is equivalent to Mβi ).
There was, however, a problem. It turned out that, while seemingly well motivated,
the translation does not relate extensions and expansions. Specifically, modal counterparts
(under Konolige’s translation) of default theories could have expansions not corresponding
to extensions. That discovery suggested a possibility that the autoepistemic logic may
not be the right modal counterpart to the default logic or that the modal reading of a
default proposed by Konolige is not appropriate. Thus, researchers began to look for other
modal logics and for other translations. Konolige related default logic to a version of
autoepistemic logic based on the notion of a strongly grounded expansion [16]. Marek
and Truszczyn´ski [20] proposed an alternative translation and represented extensions as
expansions of a modal nonmonotonic logic constructed by the method of McDermott
from the weakest modal logic N . Truszczyn´ski [32] found that the Gödel translation of
intuitionistic logic to modal logic S4 could be used to translate the default logic into the
nonmonotonic modal logic S4F.
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Gottlob [13] returned to the original problem of relating default and autoepistemic logic.
He described a mapping translating default theories into modal ones so that extensions
correspond precisely to expansions. The problem is that his translation is not modular.
The autoepistemic representation of a default theory depends on the whole theory and
cannot be obtained as the union of independent translations of individual defaults. Thus,
the approach of Gottlob does not provide an autoepistemic reading of an individual default.
In fact, in the same paper Gottlob proved that a modular translation from default logic with
the semantics of extensions to autoepistemic logic with the semantics of expansions does
not exist. In conclusion, there is no modal interpretation of a default under which extensions
would correspond to expansions.
Results of Gottlob provided strong evidence that extensions and expansions are, in
some sense, essentially different. A careful examination of intuitions as well as of
formal definitions of extensions and expansions provides some further evidence to this
effect. Moore’s logic sometimes sanctions unsupported beliefs. For example, the theory
{Kp⇒ p} has two expansions. One of them is generated by the set of all tautologies, the
other one is generated by p. Presence of p in this latter expansion is justified only by
the belief in p (by the formula Kp). In other words, the belief in p is self-supporting.
In contrast, belief sets containing self-supporting beliefs are not sanctioned by the default
logic. Even if a default
p :
p
,
providing self-supporting evidence for p, is included in the theory, the semantics of default
logic does not make any use of it. The default theory ({p:
p
},∅) has only one extension and
it consists of tautologies only. Thus, the autoepistemic logic of Moore could be viewed
as a nonmonotonic logic of belief and the default logic of Reiter could be viewed as a
nonmonotonic logic of justified belief.
As for the translation proposed by Konolige, it is clear that it does not relate
extensions and expansions. It does, however, provide some link between default logic
and autoepistemic logic. Marek and Truszczyn´ski [19] proposed the concept of a weak
extension of a default theory and proved that under the translation of Konolige, weak
extensions and expansions coincide. In other words, they proposed an alternative semantics
for default theories that could be viewed as the semantics of belief, yielding a default
version of the logic of belief. Thus, the Konolige’s translation might be the right one, once
proper semantics on each side are identified and correctly aligned.
The picture that emerges is that of a substantial research effort and several significant
results but with no definite systematic account of semantics for default and autoepistemic
theories and with no clear understanding of constructive principles behind the process
of arriving at a belief set. There has been no satisfactory solution to the matter of the
relationship between the two logics and there have been questions concerning the adequacy
of the modal reading of defaults that was proposed by Konolige. In this paper we resolve
all these issues.
We propose a unifying semantic treatment of default and autoepistemic logics in
terms of possible-world structures. A possible-world structure is a collection of two-
valued propositional interpretations each representing a state of the world that is
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possible according to the agent. Possible-world structures can be seen as special Kripke
structures [15]. They are of fundamental importance in semantic studies of the modalities
of knowledge and belief.
Possible-world structures were used in the study of autoepistemic logic. Moore de-
scribed a possible-world characterization of expansions in [24]. They also figured promi-
nently in Levesque’s studies of autoepistemic logic as the logic of “only knowing” [17].
Possible-world structures appeared in the study of default logic but only marginally. Guer-
reiro and Casanova [14] found a characterization of extensions in terms of possible-world
structures. Their work was later further expanded by Lifschitz [18]. Possible-world struc-
tures in default logic were also studied by Besnard and Schaub [4].
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive semantic framework based on the concept
of a possible-world structure and on the intuition that belief sets can be obtained in
a constructive process of building their increasingly more precise approximations. To
formally represent an approximation to a possible-world structure we use the concept of a
belief pair, that is, a pair of possible-world structures one of which provides a conservative
and the other one a liberal estimate. We introduced this notion [7] and used it there to study
ways to approximate the semantics of expansions.
Belief pairs form a complete lattice. We model the process of revising one approxima-
tion (belief pair) to obtain another approximation (that is, another belief pair) in default
and autoepistemic logics as monotone operators on the lattice of belief pairs. By selecting
different fixpoints of these operators we obtain structured families of semantics for default
and autoepistemic logics. Some of these semantics are appropriate to model the notion of
belief. Others are well suited to model the concept of justified belief. Still others have a
strong constructive flavor—the corresponding fixpoints can be obtained by iterating the
operators over the least precise approximation. Our main contributions can be summarized
as follows:
• With every modal theory T we associate an operator DT defined on the lattice
of belief pairs. Applying purely algebraic means to the operator DT , we obtain a
family of semantics for T . These semantics capture different modes of reasoning
in autoepistemic logic. One of them corresponds to the semantics of expansions as
introduced by Moore. Another one is the semantics of justified belief that eliminates
expansions containing self-supporting beliefs.
• The same approach works for the default logic! With every default theory ∆ we
associate an operator E∆ defined on the lattice of belief pairs. We apply to E∆ the
same algebraic techniques we used in the study of the operatorDT and obtain a family
of semantics for∆. Among these semantics there are the semantics of weak extensions
and the semantics of extensions capturing within default logic the concepts of belief
and justified belief, respectively.
• The semantic operator of a default theory ∆ and of the autoepistemic theory obtained
by applying to ∆ the translation of Konolige are identical. This fact has far reaching
consequences. Konolige’s translation establishes an isomorphism between the two
families of semantics of default and autoepistemic logics. In particular, the meaning of
a default theory under a particular semantics of default logic is identical to the meaning
of its translation in the corresponding semantics of the autoepistemic logic.
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In this way, we resolve the issue of the relationship between default and autoepistemic
logics and the question why Konolige’s translation did not work. Default logic under
the semantics of extensions and autoepistemic logic under the semantics of expansions
model different modes of autoepistemic reasoning and occupy different locations in
their respective families of semantics. This fact is responsible for Gottlob’s result that
defaults cannot be translated to autoepistemic formulas one by one. However, once
we properly align different semantics of default and autoepistemic logics, we find
that Konolige’s translation is correct! Viewed in the context of a family of semantics,
rather than in the context of a single one, default logic turns out to be just a fragment
of autoepistemic logic. The original default logic with extensions can be seen as a
fragment of the autoepistemic logic of justified belief. The default logic with weak
extensions (expansions) is a fragment of the autoepistemic logic of belief (the original
autoepistemic logic with expansions).
• We identify two different constructive semantics describing how to approximate the
knowledge in an autoepistemic or default theory. They are obtained by iterating certain
monotone operators on the lattice of belief pairs (operators DT , E∆ and two other
operators that are derived from them). This constructive process provides insights
on how agents can gain information about an unknown belief set by starting with
the weakest approximation possible (the bottom of the lattice of belief pairs) and by
using their base theory to iteratively improve upon this approximation until further
improvements are no longer possible. We show how these semantics can be used to
obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of a single belief set. We also study the
complexity of computing these approximation semantics and show that it is lower than
the complexity of computing individual belief sets. This result may have implications
for building automated reasoning systems for default and autoepistemic logics.
• Our investigations are based on algebraic considerations concerning fixpoints of
operators on lattices. In that we follow the approach developed by Fitting [10]
and further extended in [9] to study semantics for logic programs with negation.
Connections between logic programming with negation and autoepistemic and default
logics were established a long time ago [5,11,20]. It turns out that the structure of most
important semantics for logic programs revealed by Fitting’s work is isomorphic to the
structure of the semantics for autoepistemic and default logics that we derive in this
paper.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we introduce basic logic
terminology and review the semantic approach to autoepistemic logic proposed by
Moore [24]. In Section 3, we introduce and study the operatorDT , defined on the lattice of
belief pairs. Fixpoints of the operator DT give rise to the semantics of partial expansions
and expansions for autoepistemic logic. The least fixpoint ofDT yields the Kripke–Kleene
semantics. In Section 4, we introduce stable operators associated with the operator DT .
Fixpoints of these operators define several new semantics for the autoepistemic logic. In
Section 5, we study semantical foundations of Reiter’s default logic. We define an operator
E∆ on the lattice of belief pairs, which is a default-logic counterpart of the operator DT .
As in the case of autoepistemic logic, we derive from E∆ several other operators and show
how their fixpoints describe major semantics of default theories. Exploiting the relationship
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between the operators DT and E∆ (under the Konolige’s modal interpretation of defaults),
we establish in Section 6 a precise correspondence between default and autoepistemic
logics and explain earlier problems with relating the two logics. In Section 7, we study
the complexity of computation of suitably chosen representations of Kripke–Kleene and
well-founded fixpoints and show that the corresponding decision problems are in the class
P2 . The last section contains additional discussion of the results and conclusions.
2. Autoepistemic logic—preliminaries
In this section, we introduce basic logic terminology that we will use in the paper.
We also recall the semantic treatment of autoepistemic logic proposed by Moore [24] and
studied by Levesque [17].
In the paper, we consider the language of propositional logic determined by a set of
propositional atoms At. We denote this language by L. We also consider the language of
modal propositional logic obtained by extending L with a modal operator K . We denote
this language by LK . We call formulas in LK that do not contain any occurrences of K
modal-free or propositional formulas. Of particular interest in the paper are modal formulas
of the form Kϕ. We call them modal atoms. We refer to collections of modal formulas (that
is, subsets of LK ) as modal theories.
A two-valued interpretation assigns to each atom from At a truth value t or f. These two
truth values, together with the ordering f  t, form the standard Boolean lattice of truth
values. The set of all two-valued interpretations of At will be denoted by A.
Any set Q ⊆ A is called a possible-world structure and can be viewed as a
universal Kripke model with a total accessibility relation [6,15].1 Possible-world structures
constitute a basic tool in semantic studies of modal logics. As we stated earlier, they
represent the agent’s knowledge about the world. Possible-world structures were used by
Moore [24] and later by Levesque [17] in the investigations of autoepistemic logic.
We denote the collection of all possible-world structures (with respect to the set of
atoms At) by W . This set can be ordered by the reverse set inclusion : for Q1,Q2 ∈W ,
Q1 Q2 if Q2 ⊆Q1. The reason for the choice of this ordering is that if Q1 Q2, and
Ti, i = 1,2, are the sets of sentences of L true in Qi , then T1 ⊆ T2. The ordering  can
be thought of as a knowledge ordering. As we move up in the lattice, more and more
interpretations are excluded from possible-world structures. Thus, our knowledge of the
interpretation describing the actual world improves. Clearly, 〈W,〉 is a complete lattice.
Example 2.1. As a running example, to illustrate concepts in the paper, we will consider
the language over the set of atoms Atp = {p}. We will denote this language as Lp . The set
of interpretations A (denoted Ap , in this special case) consists of two interpretations, say
Ip and Jp , where Ip(p)= t and Jp(p)= f. The setW (denoted byWp) has four elements:
∅, Ip = {Ip}, Jp = {Jp} and Ap . The lattice (Wp,) is shown in Fig. 1.
1 Usually, the universe of a Kripke model is required to be nonempty. The empty set of worlds satisfies all
formulas, and thus corresponds to the inconsistent theory. At times, autoepistemic expansions are inconsistent,
and allowing for an empty set of worlds, as we do in this paper, captures this case.
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∅
Ip

Jp
Ap



Fig. 1. Lattice (Wp,).
To study formalisms based on the modal language, we study operators on the lattice
W and their fixpoints. We start by defining the truth function HQ,I (Q⊆A is a possible-
world structure, I ∈ A is an interpretation). The definition is inductive and proceeds as
follows:
(1) HQ,I (p)= I (p), if p is an atom.
(2) HQ,I (ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)= t if HQ,I (ϕ1)= t andHQ,I (ϕ2)= t. Otherwise, HQ,I (ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)= f.
(3) HQ,I (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)= t if HQ,I (ϕ1)= t or HQ,I (ϕ2)= t. Otherwise, HQ,I (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)= f.
(4) HQ,I (¬ϕ)= t if HQ,I (ϕ)= f. Otherwise, HQ,I (ϕ)= f.
(5) HQ,I (Kϕ)= t, if for every interpretation J ∈Q,HQ,J (ϕ)= t. Otherwise,HQ,I (Kϕ)
= f.
Let us note that the value of a modal atom Kϕ given by HQ,I does not depend on I . Thus,
it is entirely determined by the possible-world structure Q. We will denote this value by
HQ(Kϕ). We define the theory of a possible-world structure Q as the set
Th(Q)= {ϕ: HQ(Kϕ)= t}.
It is clear that every modal atom Kϕ is either true or false with respect to Q. In other words,
for every formula ϕ ∈ LK , its epistemic status is fully determined: it is either known in Q
or it is not known in Q.
For every modal theory T , Moore [24] defined an operator DT on W by:
DT (Q)=
{
I : HQ,I (ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈ T
}
.
The intuition behind this definition is as follows. The possible-world structure DT (Q) is
a revision of a possible-world structure Q. This revision consists of the worlds that are
acceptable given the constraints on agent’s beliefs captured by T . That is, the revision
consists precisely of these worlds that make all formulas in T true (in the context of
Q—the current belief state). Fixpoints of the operator DT represent “stable” belief sets—
they cannot be revised any further. Moore called the theory of a fixpoint of DT a stable
expansion of T and proposed it as a basis of autoepistemic logic: a formal description
of a belief set of a rational agent with full introspection powers reasoning from a base
theory T . In this paper, we will use the term “expansion” instead of the original term
“stable expansion”. Somewhat abusing the notation, we will use the term “expansion” also
to refer to fixpoints of the operator DT (and not only to their theories).
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Table 1
Truth assignment HQ,I (ϕ)
∅ Ip Jp Ap
Ip p,Kp,Kp⇒ p p,Kp,Kp⇒ p p,¬Kp,Kp⇒ p p,¬Kp,Kp⇒ p
Jp ¬p,Kp,Kp⇒ p ¬p,Kp,¬(Kp⇒ p) ¬p,¬Kp,Kp⇒ p ¬p,¬Kp,Kp⇒ p
Table 2
The operator DTp
X ∅ Ip Jp Ap
DTp (X) Ip Ip Ap Ap
Example 2.1 (continued). Let us consider a theory Tp = {Kp⇒ p} in the language Lp
(we regard α⇒ β as an abbreviation of ¬α ∨ β). We will determine the operator DTp . To
this end, we will first determine the truth function HQ,I for all possible-world structures
Q ∈Wp and all interpretations I ∈Ap . Because of the form of the theory Tp , it is enough
to establish the values of HQ,I for p, Kp and Kp⇒ p, only. Table 1 lists for each pair
Q,I , those formulas among p, Kp, Kp⇒ p and their negations that are true underHQ,I .
The operation of DTp can be readily obtained from this table. In particular, for each
possible-world structure Q, DTp(Q) is the set of interpretations I for which the table entry
(I,Q) contains Kp⇒ p. Table 2 lists the values of the operator DTp . It follows that the
theory Tp has two expansions: Ip andAp . Let us note thatAp is the least expansion in the
knowledge ordering.
3. Autoepistemic logic—a multivalued generalization
In [7], we generalized Moore’s approach to the three-valued case, in which we allow for
the possibility that the truth value of some modal atoms is neither t nor f but, instead, it is
captured by a new truth value, unknown or u. In this section, we recall essential elements
of our approach from [7] and extend it to the four-valued case.
Let us consider a modal theory T . We are interested in ways to form a belief set
corresponding to T or its representation in terms of some possible-world structure, say Q.
However, instead of searching for direct ways to find Q, we exploit the idea of an
approximation. An underestimate (or a conservative view) of Q is given by any superset P
of Q. Indeed, any such superset bounds Q from below in the lattice W (with respect to the
knowledge ordering ). Similarly, an overestimate (or a liberal view) of Q is provided by
any subset S of Q, as subsets of Q are upper bounds for Q in the latticeW . Interpretations
in P can be thought of as those that are still regarded by the agent as possible (we do
not have reasons to eliminate any of them yet). Interpretations in S are those that are
surely in Q—we already have established that they need to be included in the possible-
world structure describing the agent’s belief set. Together, P and S form an approximation
to Q.
To study approximations we introduce the concept of a belief pair. A belief pair is
any pair (P,S) of possible-world structures. The structure P is intuitively regarded as an
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underestimation, S is regarded as an overestimation. Consequently, we say that a belief
pair (P,S) approximates a possible-world structure Q if S ⊆ Q ⊆ P (or, in terms of
the knowledge ordering, if P  Q  S). Clearly, the set of possible-world structures
approximated by a belief pair (P,S) is not empty if and only if S ⊆ P (equivalently,
P  S). We call such belief pairs consistent (intuitively, their conservative perspective is
consistent with the liberal one). All other belief pairs are called inconsistent—they do not
approximate any possible-world structures.
In [7], we considered consistent belief pairs only. As a result we obtained a three-valued
concept of belief set (beliefs could be true, false or undefined). In this paper we allow
inconsistent belief pairs. First, the ways in which the agent establishes estimates P and S
may be independent of each other and, at least at an abstract level, inconsistent belief pairs
may arise. Second, admitting inconsistent belief pairs simplifies mathematical arguments
and yields more elegant algebraic structures. Working in this extended setting, we propose
four-valued semantics for autoepistemic logics and show that they generalize two- and
three-valued semantics that were known before.
Belief pairs can be ordered by a precision ordering pr . Namely, given two belief pairs
(P,S) and (P ′, S′) we define:
(P,S)pr (P ′, S′) if P ′ ⊆ P and S ⊆ S′,
or, equivalently,
(P,S)pr (P ′, S′) if P  P ′ and S′  S.
Let us denote by [P,S] the set {Q ∈W : P Q S}. Clearly, if (P,S)pr (P ′, S′) then
[P ′, S′] ⊆ [P,S].
In other words, larger (in the ordering pr ) belief pairs provide more precise approxi-
mations—the sets of approximated possible-world structures get smaller. This property
motivates our choice of terminology.
We denote the set of all belief pairs by B. Together with the precision ordering, the set B
forms a complete lattice. Thus, by the theorem of Tarski and Knaster, monotone operators
on B are guaranteed to have a least fixpoint. The lattice (Bp,pr) of belief pairs over the
language LP (Example 2.1) is shown in Fig. 2.
We will mention in passing that the set of all belief pairs can also be ordered by another
ordering, , defined as follows:
(P,S) (P ′, S′) if P  P ′ and S  S′.
We refer to this ordering as the knowledge ordering of B as it is a component-wise
extension of the knowledge ordering  of possible-world structures (moreover, we use
the same symbol to denote it). This ordering plays only a limited role in our considerations
(it defines the concept of minimality used in Theorems 4.4 and 5.9) thus, we do not discuss
its properties in any significant detail.
With a belief pair (P,S) and a two-valued interpretation I we associate a two-valued
truth function H2(P ,S),I defined on the set of all formulas of the modal language. Our
intention is to define H2
(P ,S),I
(ϕ) so that it provides a conservative estimate to the truth
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Fig. 2. Lattice (Bp,pr ).
value of ϕ with respect to a belief pair (P,S). The definition follows a standard recursive
pattern and the only more subtle point concerns the definition of H2(P ,S),I for modal
atoms Kϕ.
Before we give a formal definition, let us first consider a modal atom Kϕ, where ϕ
does not contain any other occurrences of K . In the belief pair (P,S), P represents the
conservative point of view. Thus, the conservative estimate for the truth value of Kϕ will
be obtained if the set P is used in the evaluation: Kϕ should be true according to the
conservative point of view if ϕ is true in all valuations in P . The situation changes in the
case of the formula ¬Kϕ where, as before, ϕ is modal-free. To compute the conservative
estimate for the truth value of this formula, we need to negate the liberal estimate for the
truth value of Kϕ. This liberal estimate can be computed with the help of S: Kϕ is true if
ϕ is true in all interpretations from S.
This discussion can be generalized to arbitrary formulas and suggests the following
approach. To obtain the conservative estimate for the truth value of a formula, modal atoms
that appear positively in the formula must be evaluated with respect to the conservative
point of view (that is with respect to the set of interpretations P ). On the other hand,
modal atoms that appear negatively must be evaluated according to the liberal perspective
(that is with respect to the interpretations in S). Formally, we have the following inductive
definition of H2(P ,S),I .
(1) H2(P ,S),I (p)= I (p), for every atom p.
(2) H2
(P ,S),I
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)= t if H2(P ,S),I (ϕ1)= t and H2(P ,S),I (ϕ2)= t. Otherwise, H2(P ,S),I ·
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)= f.
(3) H2(P ,S),I (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = t if H2(P ,S),I (ϕ1) = t or H2(P ,S),I (ϕ2) = t. Otherwise, H2(P ,S),I ·
(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)= f.
(4) H2(P ,S),I (¬ϕ)=¬H2(S,P ),I (ϕ).
(5) H2
(P ,S),I
(Kϕ)= t if H2
(P ,S),J
(ϕ)= t for all J ∈ P . Otherwise, H2
(P ,S),I
(Kϕ)= f.
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i= (t, f)
f4 = (f, f)

t4 = (t, t)
u= (f, t)



Fig. 3. The Belnap’s lattice.
Step (4) is the key. It ensures that when evaluating the negation of a formula the roles
of P and S are switched. Consequently, modal atoms appearing positively in a formula are
evaluated with respect to the belief pair (P,S) and modal atoms that appear negatively are
evaluated with respect to the belief pair (S,P ).
Clearly, to construct a liberal estimate for the truth value of ϕ with respect to a belief
pair (P,S) we can proceed similarly and use S (respectively, P ) to evaluate modal literals
appearing positively (negatively) in ϕ. It is easy to see, however, that the resulting truth
function can be expressed as H2(S,P ),I (we reverse the roles of P and S).
Conservative and liberal estimates of truth values of formulas can be combined into a
single estimate from a four-valued Belnap’s lattice of truth values. The elements of the
Belnap’s lattice are: t4 = (t, t) (true), f4 = (f, f) (false), u = (f, t) (unknown) and i = (t, f).
These values are related by the following lattice order pr (the precision ordering in
Belnap’s lattice):
(u, v)pr (u′, v′) if u u′ and v  v′
(let us recall that  is the ordering of truth values f and t, and that f  t). The Belnap’s
lattice is shown in Fig. 3.
An element of the Belnap’s lattice can be viewed as an approximation to an unknown
two-valued truth value. Clearly, the higher we are in the Belnap’s lattice, the more precise
is the approximation. At the bottom both t and f are possible (thus, the term “unknown”
for the truth value u). Each of the approximations at the second level represent exactly one
truth value. Lastly, no two-valued truth value is represented by the top element. It is due to
these “precision of approximation” intuitions (similar to intuitions underlying the precision
ordering of belief pairs), that we refer to the ordering pr as the precision ordering.2
On the elements of the Belnap lattice one can define the negation operator:
¬f4 = t4, ¬t4 = f4, ¬u = u, ¬i= i.
Under this definition, for every element (x, y) of the Belnap’s lattice we have:
¬(x, y)= (¬y,¬x),
where the negation operator on the right-hand side is the standard two-valued negation
operator.
2 As in the case of belief pairs, there is an alternative ordering of the elements in the Belnap’s lattice. It is a
component-wise extension of the standard ordering of the truth values f and t.
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Using the Belnap lattice of truth values, we now define the four-valued truth function
combining lower and upper estimates H2(P ,S),I (ϕ) and H2(S,P ),I (ϕ) as follows:
H4(P ,S),I (ϕ)=
(H2(P ,S),I (ϕ),H2(S,P ),I (ϕ)).
Directly from this definition, it follows that
H4(P ,S),I (¬ϕ)=¬H4(P ,S),I (ϕ),
where the negation operator on the right-hand side is the negation operator in the Belnap’s
lattice.
It is clear that for a modal atom Kϕ, the logical valuesH2(P ,S),I (Kϕ) andH4(P ,S),I (Kϕ)
do not depend on the interpretation I . Therefore, we will denote them by H2(P ,S)(Kϕ) and
H4(P ,S)(Kϕ), respectively.
Example 2.1 (continued). To illustrate the concepts we just introduced we will now
evaluate H4(P ,S),Ip(Kp ⇒ p) and H4(P ,S),Jp(Kp ⇒ p) for all belief pairs (P,S) ∈ Bp.
First, let us notice that for every interpretation I ,
H4(P ,S),I (Kp⇒ p) =
(H2(P ,S),I (¬Kp ∨ p), H2(S,P ),I (¬Kp ∨ p))
= (H2(P ,S),I (¬Kp)∨ I (p), H2(S,P ),I (¬Kp)∨ I (p))
= (¬H2(S,P )(Kp)∨ I (p), ¬H2(P ,S)(Kp)∨ I (p)).
Since Ip(p)= t, it follows that for every belief pair (P,S),
H4(P ,S),Ip(Kp⇒ p)= (t, t)= t4.
Similarly, since Jp(p)= f, we have
H4(P ,S),Jp(Kp⇒ p)=
(¬H2(S,P )(Kp),¬H2(P ,S)(Kp))=¬H4(P ,S)(Kp).
Let us consider the belief pair (Ap,Ip). Since Ap contains worlds in which p is false,
a conservative estimate (an underestimate) for the truth value of Kp is given by f. On the
other hand, since p is true in all worlds in Ip, the liberal estimate (an overestimate) for this
truth value is t. Thus, H4
(Ap,Ip)(Kp)= (f, t)= u. Consequently,H4(Ap,Ip),Jp (Kp⇒ p)=
¬H4
(Ap,Ip)(Kp)= u.
The values H4(P ,S),Jp(Kp ⇒ p) for the remaining belief pairs can be computed in
the same way by computing ¬H4(P ,S)(Kp). They are all listed in Table 3. The value
Table 3
The truth values H4
(P ,S),Jp
(Kp⇒ p)
∅ Ip Jp Ap
∅ f4 f4 i i
Ip f4 f4 i i
Jp u u t4 t4
Ap u u t4 t4
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H4(P ,S),Jp(Kp⇒ p) is given at the intersection of the row labeled with P and the column
labeled with S.
Using the truth function H4(P ,S) we can associate with each belief pair (P,S) its
epistemic content. We define the knowledge of (P,S), denoted kn(P,S), by
kn(P,S)= {ϕ ∈ LK : H4(P ,S)(Kϕ)= t4}.
Similarly, we define the ignorance of (P,S), denoted ig(P,S), by
ig(P,S)= {ϕ ∈LK : H4(P ,S)(Kϕ)= f4}.
The set kn(P,S) can be viewed as the set of formulas that are known in the belief pair
(P,S). The set ig(P,S) can be regarded as the set of formulas that are unknown in the
belief pair (P,S).
By the meta-knowledge of a belief pair (P,S) we mean the set of those formulas whose
epistemic status is determined: the corresponding belief is either true or false (as opposed
to unknown or inconsistent). These are precisely the formulas in kn(P,S) ∪ ig(P,S). We
call the set of all other formulas, LK \ (kn(P,S)∪ ig(P,S)), the meta-ignorance of (P,S)
as their epistemic status is not clear.
The concept of a belief pair generalizes that of a possible-world structure and the truth
function H4(P ,S),I is a four-valued generalization of the two-valued truth function HP,I .
Moreover, the concept of knowledge of a belief pair generalizes the notion of the theory
of a possible-world structure. We define a complete belief pair to be any belief pair of the
form (P,P ). We have the following result (the proof is self-evident and we omit it).
Proposition 3.1. Let P be a possible-world structure. Then
(1) for every formula ϕ ∈LK and every interpretation I ∈A,H2(P ,P ),I (ϕ)=HP,I (ϕ) and
H4(P ,P ),I (ϕ)= (HP,I (ϕ),HP,I (ϕ));
(2) kn(P,P )= {ϕ: HP (Kϕ)= t} = Th(P );
(3) kn(P,P ) ∪ ig(P,P )= LK .
The last assertion of Proposition 3.1 states that the meta-knowledge of a complete belief
pair is complete—the epistemic status of each formula ϕ is fully determined: the logical
value of knowing the formula (the logical value of the modal atom Kϕ) is either t4 or f4.
We will now study some basic properties of the truth functions H2(P ,S),I and H4(P ,S),I
involving the orderings of truth values in the Boolean and Belnap lattices.
Proposition 3.2. Let (P,S) and (P ′, S′) be belief pairs from B such that (P,S) pr
(P ′, S′). Then, for every interpretation I ∈A and for every modal formula ϕ we have:
(1) H2(P ,S),I (ϕ)H2(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ);
(2) H4(P ,S),I (ϕ)pr H4(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ).
Proof. It is clear that statement (1) implies statement (2). So, we prove statement (1)
only. We proceed by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ. The induction base
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is obvious. The cases of ϕ = ψ1 ∧ψ2 and ϕ = ψ1 ∨ψ2 follow immediately from the fact
that the operators ∧ and ∨ are monotone with respect to .
Next, we will consider the case ϕ = Kψ . If H2(P ,S),I (Kψ) = f, the inequality (1)
follows. So, let us assume that H2(P ,S),I (Kψ)= t. Let J ∈ P ′. Since (P,S) pr (P ′, S′),
we have that P ′ ⊆ P . Thus, J ∈ P and, consequently, H2(P ,S),J (ψ) = t. By the induction
hypothesis it follows thatH2(P ,S),J (ψ)H2(P ′,S ′),J (ψ). Hence,H2(P ′,S ′),J (ψ)= t. Since J
is an arbitrary element of P ′, we obtain that H2
(P ′,S ′),I (Kψ) = t. Thus, the inequality (1)
follows in the case H2(P ,S),I (Kψ)= t, too.
Finally, we will consider the case when ϕ = ¬ψ . As before, it is enough to consider
the case when H2(P ,S),I (ϕ) = t. In this case, we have that H2(S,P ),I (ψ) = f. Moreover,
since (P,S) pr (P ′, S′), we also have that (S′,P ′) pr (S,P ). Thus, by the induction
hypothesis, H2
(S ′,P ′),I (ψ)  H2(S,P ),I (ψ) = f. It follows that H2(S ′,P ′),I (ψ) = f and,
consequently,H2
(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ)= t. Hence, the inequality (1) holds for ϕ =¬ψ . ✷
This result has several interesting corollaries. The first of them is that for a consistent
belief pair (P,S), the truth functionH4(P ,S),I assigns only consistent truth values.
Corollary 3.3. If (P,S) is a consistent belief pair then for every interpretation I ∈A and
every formula ϕ, H4(P ,S),I (ϕ) is consistent (that is, H4(P ,S),I (ϕ) = i).
Proof. It is easy to see that if (P,S) is consistent, then:
(P,S)pr (S,P ).
By Proposition 3.2(1), H2(P ,S),I (ϕ)  H2(S,P ),I (ϕ), and hence H4(P ,S),I (ϕ) is consis-
tent. ✷
The next corollary is concerned with the concept of the epistemic content of a belief
pair. We show that, under the restriction to consistent belief pairs, the notion is monotone
with respect to the ordering pr .
Corollary 3.4. Let B and B ′ be consistent belief pairs. If B pr B ′ then
kn(B)⊆ kn(B ′) and ig(B)⊆ ig(B ′).
Proof. Let us consider a formula ϕ ∈ kn(B). Then, we have that H4B(Kϕ) = t4. Since
B ′ is consistent, H4
B ′(Kϕ) = i (Corollary 3.3). Further, since B pr B ′, H4B(Kϕ) pr
H4
B ′(Kϕ). Thus,H4B ′(Kϕ)= t4 and, consequently, ϕ ∈ kn(B ′). The proof in the case when
ϕ ∈ ig(B) is similar. ✷
We will now study operators on the lattice (B,pr) and their properties. We will focus
on operators that are monotone with respect to pr (pr -monotone, for short). Each such
an operator has a pr -least fixpoint by the theorem of Tarski and Knaster. In addition to
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monotonicity, we will impose on operators one more condition, symmetry. An operator O
on B is symmetric if for every belief pairs (P,S) and (P ′, S′)
O(P,S)= (P ′, S′) if and only if O(S,P )= (S′,P ′).
Proposition 3.5. Let O be an operator on the lattice B that is pr -monotone and
symmetric.
(1) For every consistent belief pair B , O(B) is consistent.
(2) The least fixpoint of O is consistent. Moreover, if it is complete, it is a unique fixpoint
of O .
Proof. (1) Let B = (P,S) be a consistent belief pair. Then, P  S and, consequently,
(P,S)pr (S,P ). By the pr -monotonicity of O , O(P,S)pr O(S,P ). Let O(P,S)=
(P ′, S′). By the symmetry of O , O(S,P ) = (S′,P ′). Thus, (P ′, S′) pr (S′,P ′) and,
consequently, P ′  S′. That is, O(P,S) is consistent.
(2) Let us denote the least fixpoint of O by (P,S). Since O is symmetric, (S,P ) is also
a fixpoint of O . Thus, (P,S)pr (S,P ). Consequently, P  S and (P,S) is consistent.
Let us now assume that (P,S) is complete. Let (P ′, S′) be a fixpoint of O . By the
symmetry of O , (S′,P ′) is also a fixpoint of O . Since (P,S) is the least fixpoint of O and
since P = S (by the completeness of (P,S)), we obtain
(P,P ) pr (P ′, S′) and (P,P )pr (S′,P ′).
The first relation implies that P ′ ⊆ P and P ⊆ S′. The second relation implies that S′ ⊆ P
and P ⊆ P ′. Thus, P ′ = S′ = P or, equivalently, (P ′, S′)= (P,S). ✷
The next result concerning fixpoints of pr -monotone and symmetric operators on B
shows that the knowledge and ignorance of the least fixpoint of an operator can be used to
approximate the knowledge and ignorance of any other fixpoint.
Proposition 3.6. Let B be the least fixpoint of a pr -monotone and symmetric operator O
defined on the lattice (B,pr). For every fixpoint B ′ of O we have:
kn(B)⊆ kn(B ′) and ig(B)⊆ ig(B ′).
Proof. Let us assume that B = (P,S) and B ′ = (P ′, S′). Let us consider a formula
ϕ ∈ kn(B) and an interpretation I ∈ P . We haveH4(P ,S),I (ϕ)= t4. Since (P,S) is the least
fixpoint of O , (P,S)pr (P ′, S′). By Proposition 3.2, it follows that H4(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ)= t4 or
H4
(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ)= i. Let us assume that H4(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ)= i. Then, H4(S ′,P ′),I (ϕ)= u. However,
by the symmetry of O , (S′,P ′) is also a fixpoint of O . It follows that (P,S) pr (S′,P ′)
and
t4 =H4(P ,S),I (ϕ)pr H4(S ′,P ′),I (ϕ)= u,
a contradiction. Consequently, H4
(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ) = t4. Since I is an arbitrary element of P
and P ′ ⊆ P , it follows that H4
(P ′,S ′)(Kϕ)= t4. Thus, ϕ ∈ kn(B ′) and kn(B)⊆ kn(B ′), as
claimed. The other inclusion can be proved in a similar fashion. ✷
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This result is related to Corollary 3.4. We do not require here that belief pairs B
and B ′ be consistent. Instead, we require that one of them is a least fixpoint (and so, it
is consistent), and another one is an arbitrary fixpoint (possibly inconsistent) of a pr -
monotone and symmetric operator on the lattice (B,pr).
Let T be a modal theory. We will now associate with T an operator on the lattice B. Let
(P,S) be a belief pair. Extending the definition from [7], we set
DT (P,S)=
(DlT (P,S),DuT (P,S)),
where
DlT (P,S)=
{
I : H2(S,P ),I (T )= t
}
and DuT (P,S)=
{
I : H2(P ,S),I (T )= t
}
,
and where H2B,I (T ) stands for the greatest lower bound of the set {H2B,I (ϕ): ϕ ∈ T } (in
other words,H2B,I (T )= t if and only ifH2B,I (ϕ)= t for every ϕ ∈ T ). We refer to fixpoints
of the operator DT as partial expansions.
Intuitively, the operator DT describes how an agent might revise a belief pair (P,S).
The objective is to obtain a new underestimate P ′ and a new overestimate S′. Given the
current belief pair (P,S), the agent can exclude from P ′, as definitely impossible, all
these interpretations in which at least one formula in T is false even according to the
liberal estimate of truth values. All other must still be regarded as possible and included
in P ′. Thus, P ′ consists of all those interpretations for which all formulas from T are true
according to the liberal estimates of truth values (given the current approximation (P,S)).
To construct S′ (an overestimate) the agent includes in S′ only those interpretations that the
agent is certain should be included, given the knowledge captured by the current belief pair
(P,S). Thus, the agent includes in S′ all those interpretations which make all formulas in
T true even according to conservative estimates.
Example 2.1 (continued). We will compute DlTp (X,Ip) for all possible-world structures
X ∈Wp . Let us observe that
H2(Ip,Ap)(¬Kp)=¬H2(Ap,Ip)(Kp)= t.
Thus,
DlTp (Ap,Ip)=
{
I : H2(Ip,Ap),I (¬Kp ∨ p)= t
}=Ap.
Similarly,
H2(Ip,∅)(¬Kp)=¬H2(∅,Ip)(Kp)= f.
Thus,
DlTp (∅,Ip)=
{
I : H2(Ip,∅),I (¬Kp ∨ p)= t
}= Ip.
The remaining values DlTp (X,Ip) can be computed in the same fashion. They are all are
shown in Table 4.
Proceeding in a similar way, we can also compute valuesDuTp (X,Ip). First, it is easy to
see that for every X ∈Wp,
H2(X,Ip)(¬Kp)=¬H2(Ip,X)(Kp)= f.
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Table 4
The operator Dl
Tp
(·,Ip)
X ∅ Ip Jp Ap
Dl
Tp
(X,Ip) Ip Ip Ap Ap
Table 5
The operator DuTp (·,Ip)
X ∅ Ip Jp Ap
DuTp (X,Ip) Ip Ip Ip Ip
Thus, for every X ∈Wp , DuTp (Xp,Ip)= Ip (Table 5).
The operatorDT plays a fundamental role in our study of autoepistemic logic. It allows
us to derive all major semantics of autoepistemic theories in two-valued, three-valued and
four-valued settings. We will first briefly discuss how one can reconstruct from the operator
DT the two-valued approach of Moore and his semantics of expansions.
Proposition 3.7. Let T be a modal theory. Then, for every possible-world structure P ,
we have DT (P,P ) = (DT (P ),DT (P )). Consequently, a complete belief pair (P,P ) is a
fixpoint of DT if and only if P is a fixpoint of DT .
Proof. The equality DT (P,P )= (DT (P ),DT (P )) follows directly from Proposition 3.1
and the definitions of the operators DT and DT .
Let us assume that DT (P)= P . Then
DT (P,P )=
(
DT (P),DT (P )
)= (P,P ).
Conversely, if DT (P,P ) = (P,P ), then (DT (P ),DT (P )) = DT (P,P ) = (P,P ). Thus,
DT (P)= P . ✷
Example 2.1 (continued). Since Ip and Ap are fixpoints of the operator DTp , by Proposi-
tion 3.7 the belief pairs (Ip,Ip) and (Ap,Ap) are fixpoints of the operatorDTp . From the
results summarized in Tables 4 and 5, it follows thatDTp has two more fixpoints: (Ap,Ip)
and (Ip,Ap). These fixpoints are not complete. The first of them is consistent, the other
one is not.
Next, we observe that two belief pairs that define the same truth value for all modal
atoms occurring in theory T , that is, are epistemically equivalent, are revised by the
operator DT into the same belief pair. Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.8. Let T be a modal theory and let (P,S) and (P ′, S′) be belief pairs such
that for every modal atom Kψ of T , H4(P ,S)(Kψ) = H4(P ′,S ′)(Kψ). Then, DT (P,S) =
DT (P ′, S′).
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Proof. Clearly,
H2(P ,S)(Kψ)=H2(P ′,S ′)(Kψ) and H2(S,P )(Kψ)=H2(S ′,P ′)(Kψ).
Thus, for every interpretation I and every formula ϕ ∈ T ,
H2(P ,S),I (ϕ)=H2(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ) and H2(S,P ),I (ϕ)=H2(S ′,P ′),I (ϕ).
Therefore,
DlT (P,S)=DlT (P ′, S′) and DuT (P,S)=DuT (P ′, S′).
Consequently,DT (P,S)=DT (P ′, S′). ✷
The next result is of fundamental importance. It asserts that the operator DT is pr -
monotone and symmetric. Thus, by the theorem of Tarski and Knaster, it has a unique least
fixpoint. In addition, Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 apply to DT .
Proposition 3.9. The operator DT is symmetric and pr -monotone.
Proof. Directly from the definitions it follows that DlT (P,S) = DuT (S,P ), hence DT is
symmetric.
To prove the monotonicity part of the claim, let us consider two belief pairs (P,S) and
(P ′, S′) such that (P,S) pr (P ′, S′). We need to prove that
DlT (P ′, S′)⊆DlT (P,S) and DuT (P,S)⊆DuT (P ′, S′).
Let I ∈ DlT (P ′, S′). Then, H2(S ′,P ′),I (T ) = t. Since (P,S) pr (P ′, S′), (S′,P ′) pr
(S,P ). Thus, by Proposition 3.2, H2(S,P ),I (T )= t and, consequently, I ∈ DlT (P,S). The
second inclusion can be proved in the same manner. ✷
Corollary 3.3 and Propositions 3.5 and 3.9 provide a connection between the approach
in this paper and our earlier work [7]. Corollary 3.3 shows that for a consistent belief
pair (P,S), the truth function H4
(P ,S),I
is three-valued. In fact, one can check that if
(P,S) is a consistent belief pair, then the truth function H4(P ,S),I coincides with the three-
valued truth function considered in [7]. Proposition 3.5 implies that the operator DT maps
consistent belief pairs into consistent belief pairs. One can check that the restriction of DT
to consistent belief pairs coincides with the operator on consistent belief pairs considered
in [7]. Thus, the approach developed in this paper, admitting the possibility of inconsistent
belief pairs, is a generalization of the approach from [7].
As we noticed earlier, Proposition 3.9 implies that the operator DT has a unique pr -
least fixpoint. We denote it by KK(T ) and refer to it as the Kripke–Kleene fixpoint for T .
Similarly, we call the semantics it defines Kripke–Kleene semantics for T . In this semantics
a formula ϕ has logical value v (where v is from the Belnap lattice) if H4KK(T )(Kϕ)= v.
This choice of terms is motivated by a close analogy between the least fixpoint of the
operator DT and the Kripke–Kleene semantics for logic programs (see Section 8).
The Kripke–Kleene fixpoint has a clear constructive flavor. It can be obtained by
iterating the operator DT , starting at the least informative belief pair, (A,∅).
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Example 2.1 (continued). We will now find the least fixpoint of the operatorDTp (the least
partial expansion of Tp). We start by computing DTp (Ap,∅). Let us observe that
H2(∅,Ap),I (¬Kp)=¬H2(Ap,∅),I (Kp)= t.
Thus,
DlTp (Ap,∅)=
{
I : H2(∅,Ap),I (¬Kp ∨ p)= t
}=Ap.
In a similar fashion,
H2(Ap,∅),I (¬Kp)=¬H2(∅,Ap),I (Kp)= f.
Consequently,
DuTp (Ap,∅)=
{
I : H2(Ap,∅),I (¬Kp ∨ p)= t
}= Ip.
Thus, DTp(Ap,∅) = (Ap,Ip). We already showed earlier that DTp (Ap,Ip) = (Ap,Ip)
(see Tables 4 and 5). Thus, (Ap,Ip) is the least fixpoint (Kripke–Kleene fixpoint) of DTp .
We now summarize basic properties of the fixpoint KK(T ) as a corollary to Proposi-
tions 3.5, 3.6, and 3.9.
Corollary 3.10. Let T be a modal theory.
(1) The fixpoint KK(T ) is consistent.
(2) For every partial expansion B of T , KK(T )pr B .
(3) For every partial expansion B of T ,
kn
(
KK(T )
)⊆ kn(B) and ig(KK(T ))⊆ ig(B).
(4) If KK(T ) is a complete belief pair, then it is the unique consistent partial expansion of
T . Moreover the possible-world structure P such that KK(T )= (P,P ) is the unique
expansion of T .
Corollary 3.10 has important epistemological consequences. It states that the Kripke–
Kleene fixpoint is a consistent belief pair that approximates belief sets that are formalized
as fixpoints of the operator DT . In other words, the iterative approximation process is
sound. Next, it demonstrates how the knowledge and ignorance of the Kripke–Kleene
fixpoint approximates that of all other partial expansions of T . Lastly, it implies that
the Kripke–Kleene semantics provides sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of an
expansion of T . Corollary 3.10 has also computational implications. We discuss them later
in Section 7.
4. Autoepistemic logic—extensions and the well-founded semantics
In this section we show that the theory of belief pairs allows us to introduce new
semantics for autoepistemic logic. Given a modal theory T , we use the operator DT to
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define two additional operators: the operatorDstT defined on the latticeW , and the operatorDstT defined on the lattice B. They give rise to semantics for autoepistemic logic that are
closely related to the semantics of extensions for default logic. One of them, the semantics
obtained by means of fixpoints of the operatorDstT , is a perfect match to Reiter’s semantics
of extensions for default logic, an object long sought after in the autoepistemic logic.
The operator DstT is pr -monotone, and its least fixpoint gives rise to the well-founded
semantics for autoepistemic logic.
Let S be a possible-world structure, that is, S ∈ W . For a possible-world structure
P ∈W we define
DS,T (P )=DlT (P,S).
The operator DS,T is a monotone operator on the lattice (W,). Indeed, if P1  P2, then
(P1, S)pr (P2, S). By the pr -monotonicity of DT , DT (P1, S)pr DT (P2, S). Thus,
DS,T (P1)=DlT (P1, S)DlT (P2, S)=DS,T (P2).
By the theorem of Tarski and Knaster, the operator DS,T has a least fixpoint. We define
DstT (S)= lfp(DS,T )= lfp
(DlT (·, S)).
Intuitively, DstT (S) can be viewed as a preferred conservative estimate of what is believed
given a fixed S (that is, given a fixed liberal estimate on beliefs).3
In a similar way as for lfp(DuT (·, S)), we argue that lfp(DuT (P, ·)) can be regarded as a
preferred liberal estimate of what is believed, given a fixed conservative point of view. Let
us notice that by the symmetry of the operator DT ,
DuT (P,S)=DlT (S,P ).
Thus,
lfp(DuT (P, ·))= lfp(DlT (·,P ))=DstT (P ).
Having defined the operatorDstT on possible world structures, we now define an operatorDstT on belief pairs as follows:
DstT (P,S)=
(
DstT (S),D
st
T (P )
)
.
From our earlier discussion it follows that the operator DstT provides yet another way
of revising belief pairs: A belief pair (P,S) is replaced by the belief pair DstT (P,S) =
(P ′, S′), where P ′ is a conservative estimate of what is believed given an old liberal
estimate S, and S′ is a liberal estimate on what is believed given an old conservative
estimate P .
Clearly, DstT is an operator on the lattice (W,). We refer to possible-world structures
that are fixpoints of the operator DstT (and also to their theories) as extensions. The choice
of the term is not arbitrary. We show in Section 6 that extensions of modal theories can
be regarded as generalizations of extensions of default theories. We call fixpoints of the
operatorDstT , defined on the lattice (B,pr) of belief pairs, partial extensions, as they can
be viewed as “belief-pair” versions of extensions. Indeed, we have the following property
relating fixpoints of the operators DstT and DstT .
3 A similar construction, in the context of logic programming, was introduced by Przymusinski [27].
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Theorem 4.1. For every modal theory T , a possible-world structure P is a fixpoint of DstT
if and only if a belief pair (P,P ) is a fixpoint of DstT .
Proof. The statement follows immediately from the definition of the operator DstT . ✷
Example 2.1 (continued). We will determine the operator DstTp . Let us first observe that for
every S ∈Wp and each I :
H2(S,Ap),I (¬Kp)=¬H2(Ap,S),I (Kp)= t
and hence,
H2(S,Ap),I (Kp⇒ p)= t.
Consequently, for each S, it holds that
DlTp (Ap,S)=
{
I : H2(S,Ap),I (Kp⇒ p)= t
}=Ap.
It follows that for every S ∈Wp, DlTp (Ap,S)=Ap . Thus, Ap is the least fixpoint of the
operatorDlTp (·, S) (let us recall thatAp is the least element of the lattice (Wp,) on which
the operator DlTp (·, S) is defined). That is,
DstTp (S)=Ap,
for every S ∈Wp .
It follows that the theory Tp has exactly one extension, Ap (operator DstTp has exactly
one fixpoint). It is also easy to see that (Ap,Ap) is the only partial extension of Tp (the
only fixpoint of the operatorDstTp ).
The circular dependence allowing the agent to accept p to the belief set just on the basis
of this agent believing in p, allowed under the semantics of expansions, is eliminated in
the case of extensions. For instance, as we observed before, the theory {Kp ⇒ p} has
two expansions. One of them is determined by the possible-world structure consisting
of all interpretations, the other one—by the possible-world structure consisting of all
interpretations in which p is true. It is this second expansion that suffers from the circular-
argument problem: the belief in p is the only justification for having p in this expansion.
At the same time, the theory {Kp⇒ p} has exactly one extension, the one given by the
possible-world structure consisting of all interpretations. The atom p is not known in it
and, hence, circular arguments are not used in the construction of this expansion.
The following result collects most important properties of the operators DstT and DstT .
Theorem 4.2. Let T be a modal theory. The operatorDstT is-antimonotone. The operator
DstT is pr -monotone and symmetric. Moreover, for every consistent belief pair B , DstT (B)
is also consistent.
Proof. We will use the following additional basic property of operators on lattices. An
element x of a lattice L is a prefixpoint of an operator O :L→ L if O(x) x . A proof of
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the theorem by Tarski and Knaster shows that on a complete lattice L the least prefixpoint
of a monotonic operator O exists and, in fact, is equal to the least fixpoint of O . Thus for
each prefixpoint x of O , lfp(O) x .
Let us consider two possible-world structures P,S ∈ W such that P  S. We set
P ′ = DstT (P ) and S′ = DstT (S). We have that P ′ = DstT (P ) = lfp(DlT (·,P )). Therefore,
P ′ = DlT (P ′,P ). Since (P ′, S) pr (P ′,P ), by pr -monotonicity of DT we obtain that
DlT (P ′, S)  DlT (P ′,P ) = P ′. Consequently, P ′ is a prefixpoint of DlT (·, S). By our
earlier remarks, S′ =DstT (S)= lfp(DlT (·, S)) P ′.
The pr -monotonicity of the operator DstT is an immediate consequence of the -
antimonotonicity of DstT . The symmetry of the operator DstT follows directly from its
definition.
The last part of the assertion follows from Proposition 3.5. ✷
Theorem 4.2 implies, in particular, that the operatorDstT has a least fixpoint with respect
to the ordering pr . We will refer to this fixpoint as the well-founded fixpoint of T or
well-founded partial extension of T . We will denote this fixpoint by WF(T ). Our choice
of the term again is not accidental. The semantics specified by the well-founded fixpoint
WF(T ) is closely related to the well-founded semantics for default logic [2] and logic
programming [34].
The well-founded partial extension for a modal theory can be used to approximate
all partial extensions of T . It also provides a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of
an extension. We have the following result, analogous to Corollary 3.10. It follows from
Theorem 4.2 and Propositions 3.5 and 3.6.
Corollary 4.3. Let T be a modal theory.
(1) The fixpoint WF(T ) is consistent.
(2) For every partial extension B of T , WF(T )pr B .
(3) For every partial extension B of T ,
kn
(
WF(T )
)⊆ kn(B) and ig(WF(T ))⊆ ig(B).
(4) If WF(T ) is a complete belief pair, then it is the unique partial extension of T .
Moreover the possible-world structure P such that WF(T ) = (P,P ) is the unique
extension of T .
Well-founded semantics has a constructive flavor. It can be obtained by iterating the
operator DstT over the belief pair (A,∅). We will discuss an algorithm for computing
WF(T ) in Section 7. We will also show there that the problem of computing the well-
founded semantics is in the class 2P .
The next result connects expansions and the Kripke–Kleene semantics with extensions
and the well-founded semantics. It shows that the well-founded semantics is stronger than
the Kripke–Kleene semantics and that (partial) extensions of T are (partial) expansions
of T . Moreover extensions satisfy an additional minimality condition with respect to the
ordering  in B.
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This minimality condition is expressed in terms of the following order on belief pairs:
we define (P,S) (P ′, S′) if P  P ′ and S  S′. We briefly mentioned it in Section 3 and
referred to it as the knowledge ordering.
Theorem 4.4. Let T be a modal theory. Then:
(1) KK(T )pr WF(T ).
(2) Every extension of T is a -minimal expansion of T .
(3) Every partial extension (P,S) of T is a -minimal partial expansion of T : for every
partial expansion (P ′, S′), if P ′  P and S′  S, then P = P ′ and S = S′.
Proof. (1) Since KK(T ) is the pr -least fixpoint of DT , it suffices to show that each
fixpoint of DstT is a fixpoint of DT . Let (P,S) be a fixpoint of DstT . Then P =DstT (S) =
lfp(DlT (·, S)) and consequently, DlT (P,S) = P . Similarly, S = lfp(DlT (·,P )) and, hence,
S =DlT (S,P )=DuT (P,S). It follows that DT (P,S)= (P,S).
Since (2) is a special case of (3), it suffices to prove (3). Let (P,S) be a partial extension
of T . Let us assume that (P ′, S′) is a fixpoint of DT such that (P ′, S′)  (P,S). Since
P ′  P , it follows that (S′,P ) pr (S′,P ′). The pr -monotonicity of DT implies that
DlT (S′,P )  DlT (S′,P ′) = S′. Thus, S′ is a prefixpoint of the operator DlT (·,P ). Since
S is the least fixpoint of DlT (·,P ), it follows that S  S′ (we refer the reader to the
comment we made in the proof of Theorem 4.2). Now, however, due to the assumption
that (P ′, S′)  (P,S), it follows that S′  S. Consequently, S and S′ are identical. By a
similar argument, we prove that P and P ′ are identical. Thus, (P ′, S′)= (P,S) which, in
turn, implies that (P,S) is a -minimal fixpoint of DT . ✷
Example 2.1 (continued). In the case of the theory Tp, KK(Tp)= (Ap,Ip) and WF(Tp)=
(Ap,Ap). Thus, we indeed have KK(Tp) pr WF(Tp) (see Fig. 2). Let us also note that
the partial extension (Ap,Ap) is indeed a -minimal partial expansion of Tp.
AE logic of Moore
expansions

partial expansions
Kripke–Kleene fixpoint

DT
DT
partial extensions
well-founded semantics
 extensions

Dst
T
Dst
T





Fig. 4. Operators associated with autoepistemic logic.
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We can give now a schematic illustration of the panorama of semantics for autoepis-
temic logic (Fig. 4). The central position is occupied by the operatorDT . Its fixpoints yield
the semantics of partial expansions and its least fixpoint yields the Kripke–Kleene seman-
tics. Restriction of the operator DT to complete belief pairs leads to the operator DT ,
originally introduced by Moore, and results in the semantics of expansions. The operator
DT also gives rise to the operators DstT and DstT that yield new semantics for autoepistemic
logic: the semantics of extensions, the semantics of partial extensions and the well-founded
semantics.
5. Default logic
While possible-world semantics played a prominent role in the study of autoepistemic
logics [7,17,24] it has not, up to now, had a similar impact on default logic. In this
section we will introduce a comprehensive semantic treatment of default logic in terms
of possible-world structures and belief pairs. Our approach will follow closely that used in
the preceding sections.
We observed earlier that autoepistemic logic can be viewed as the logic of the operator
DT . Its fixpoints, and fixpoints of the operators that can be derived from DT , determine
all major semantics for autoepistemic logic. We will now develop a similar treatment of
default logic.
We start by recalling basic concepts in default logic. For more details we refer the reader
to [21]. A default is an expression of the form
α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
,
where α, β1, . . . , βk and γ are propositional formulas from the language L. The formula α
is called the prerequisite of the default. The formulas β1, . . . , βk are called its justifications.
Finally, the formula γ is called the consequent of the default.
A default theory is a pair (D,W), whereD is a set of defaults and W is a set of formulas
from L. To define a semantics for a default theory ∆ = (D,W), Reiter introduced an
operator Γ∆ on sets of propositional formulas [28]. Given a set of formulas X, we say that
a default d is X-applicable if for every justification β of d , X  ¬β (intuitively, a default
is X-applicable if none of its justifications is outright contradicted by X). For a set X of
propositional formulas, Reiter defined Γ∆(X) to be a least set of formulas Y such that:
(1) Y is closed under propositional provability.
(2) W ⊆ Y .
(3) For every X-applicable default d ∈ D, if the prerequisite of d is in Y then so is the
consequent of d .
It is easy to see that the least set of formulas satisfying conditions (1)–(3) exists. Thus, the
operator Γ∆ is well defined. A set of formulas E is an extension of a default theory ∆ if
E = Γ∆(E) [28].
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While the notion of an extension received most attention, over the years several other
classes of theories were proposed as alternative semantics of default theories. One of them,
the semantics of weak extensions [20], is especially relevant to our considerations. Let us
define Γ w∆ (X) to be a least set of formulas Y such that:
(1) Y is closed under propositional provability.
(2) W ⊆ Y .
(3) For every X-applicable default d ∈ D, if the prerequisite of d is in X then the
consequent of d is in Y .
As before, it is easy to see that the operator Γ w∆ is well defined. A set of formulas E is a
weak extension of a default theory ∆ if E = Γ w∆ (E). The concepts of extension and weak
extension are closely related (not surprisingly, given that their definitions are so similar,
differing only in the third condition). We refer the reader to [21] for a detailed discussion
of default logic and properties of extensions and weak extensions.
We will introduce now an approach to default logic based on the semantic notions of a
possible-world structure and of a belief pair. As before, we start with a two-valued truth
function that gives a conservative estimate of the logical value of a formula or a default
with respect to a belief pair (P,S) and an interpretation I .
For a propositional formula ϕ, we define
Hdl(P ,S),I (ϕ)= I (ϕ).
For a default d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
, we set
Hdl(P ,S),I (d)= t
if at least one of the following conditions holds:
(1) There is J ∈ S such that J (α)= f.
(2) There is i , 1 i  k, such that for every J ∈ P , J (βi)= f.
(3) I (γ )= t.
We set Hdl(P ,S),I (d) = f, otherwise. Clearly, the definition of Hdl(P ,S),I (d) agrees with the
intuitive reading of a default d : it is true (according to a conservative point of view) if its
prerequisite is false (even with respect to a liberal view captured by S) or if at least one
of its justifications is perceived as impossible (it is false according to a conservative point
of view captured by P ) or if its consequent is true (with respect to I ). As before, we can
also argue that Hdl(S,P ),I (d) provides a liberal estimate for a truth value of d with respect to
(P,S) (the roles of P and S are reversed).
This truth functionHdl
(P ,S),I
satisfies a monotonicity property analogous to that satisfied
by the truth function H2(P ,S),I in the case of autoepistemic logic (see Proposition 3.2).
Proposition 5.1. Let (P,S) and (P ′, S′) be belief pairs from B such that (P,S) pr
(P ′, S′). Then, for each default d , for each propositional formula ϕ and for each
interpretation I ∈A, Hdl
(P ,S),I
(d)Hdl
(P ′,S ′),I (d) and Hdl(P ,S),I (ϕ)=Hdl(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ).
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Proof. To prove the first part of the assertion let us consider a default d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
and let
us assume that Hdl
(P ,S),I
(d)= t (the case when Hdl
(P ,S),I
(d)= f is trivial). By the definition
of Hdl(P ,S),I (d), there are three cases to consider.
(1) There is J ∈ S such that J (α)= f. Since S ⊆ S′, it follows that Hdl
(P ′,S ′),I (d)= t.
(2) There is i , 1  i  k, such that for every J ∈ P , J (βi) = f. Since P ′ ⊆ P , it again
follows that Hdl
(P ′,S ′),I (d)= t.
(3) We have I (γ )= t. In this case, clearly, Hdl
(P ′,S ′),I (d)= t, as well.
The second part of the assertion is straightforward as Hdl(P ,S),I (ϕ) = I (ϕ) =
Hdl
(P ′,S ′),I (ϕ). ✷
Let ∆ = (D,W) be a default theory. We use the truth function Hdl(P ,S),I to define an
operator E∆ on the lattice B of belief pairs:
E∆(P,S)=
(E l∆(P,S),Eu∆(P,S)),
where
E l∆(P,S)=
{
I : Hdl(S,P ),I (∆)= t
}
and Eu∆(P,S)=
{
I : Hdl(P ,S),I (∆)= t
}
(HdlB,I (∆) = t stands for the statement that HdlB,I (d) = t for every element (formula or
default) d ∈D∪W ). This definition can be justified similarly as that of the operatorDT in
Section 4. We now have the following key property of the operator E∆.
Proposition 5.2. The operator E∆ is pr -monotone and symmetric.
Proof. By the definition, we have E l∆(P,S)= Eu∆(S,P ). Thus, E∆ is a symmetric operator.
To prove the pr -monotonicity of the operator E∆, let us consider two belief pairs (P,S)
and (P ′, S′) such that (P,S)pr (P ′, S′). We need to prove that
E l∆(P ′, S′)⊆ E l∆(P,S) and Eu∆(P,S)⊆ Eu∆(P ′, S′).
Let I ∈ E l∆(P ′, S′). Then, Hdl(S ′,P ′),I (∆) = t. Since (P,S) pr (P ′, S′), it follows that
(S′,P ′) pr (S,P ). Thus, by Proposition 5.1, Hdl(S,P ),I (∆) = t and, consequently, I ∈
E l∆(P,S). The second inclusion can be proved in the same manner. ✷
Let Q be a possible-world structure. We define
E∆(Q)= E l∆(Q,Q)
(or, equivalently, E∆(Q)= Eu∆(Q,Q)). Clearly,
E∆(Q,Q)=
(
E∆(Q),E∆(Q)
)
.
As we will show later, fixpoints of the operators E∆ and E∆ correspond to fixpoints of
the operators DT and DT . Thus, we will call them expansions and partial expansions of
∆, respectively. It is clear that
Q=E∆(Q) if and only if (Q,Q)= E∆(Q,Q).
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Thus, those partial expansions of ∆ that are complete correspond precisely to expansions
of ∆.
To the best of our knowledge, the operator E∆ has not appeared explicitly in the
literature before. Its fixpoints, however, did. It turns out that they correspond to weak
extensions [19]. Hence, the semantics given by the operator E∆ (by its fixpoints, to be
precise) is the semantics of weak extensions.
Theorem 5.3. Let ∆ be a default theory. If a possible-world structure Q is an expansion
of ∆ then {ϕ ∈L: I (ϕ)= t, for every I ∈Q} is a weak extension of ∆. Conversely, if E is
a weak extension of ∆ then Q= {I ∈A: I (ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈E} is an expansion of ∆.
Proof. Let us assume that ∆ is of the form (D,W). Let Q be an expansion of ∆. Directly
from the definition of an expansion it follows that
Q= {I ∈A: Hdl(Q,Q),I (∆)= t}. (1)
Let us set
YQ =
{
ϕ ∈L: I (ϕ)= t, for every I ∈Q}.
We will show that YQ is a weak extension of (D,W). To this end, we will show that
YQ = Γ w∆ (YQ).
First, it follows from the definition of YQ that it is closed under propositional provability.
Further, from (1) it follows that for every I ∈Q and for every ϕ ∈W , I (ϕ) = t. Hence,
W ⊆ YQ.
Next, let us consider a YQ-applicable default
d = α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
and let us assume that α ∈ YQ. Let I ∈ Q. Eq. (1) implies that Hdl(Q,Q),I (d) = t. Since
α ∈ YQ, there is no J ∈ YQ such that J (α) = f. By YQ-applicability of d , for every i ,
1  i  k, YQ  ¬βi . Since YQ is closed under propositional provability, we have that
¬βi /∈ YQ. Thus, for every i , 1  i  k, there is a valuation J ∈ Q such that J (βi) = t.
Consequently, it follows that I (γ ) = t. Since I is an arbitrary valuation from Q, we find
that γ ∈ YQ.
To summarize, we proved that YQ satisfies all three conditions on a set Y in the
definition of Γ w∆ (X), with X = YQ. Since Γ w∆ (YQ) is the least of all sets satisfying these
conditions, it follows that Γ w∆ (YQ)⊆ YQ.
To prove the converse inclusion, let us consider a valuation I ∈A such that for every
ϕ ∈ Γ w∆ (YQ), I (ϕ) = t. We will show that I ∈ Q. By (1), it will suffice to show that
Hdl(Q,Q),I (∆) = t. Since W ⊆ Γ w∆ (YQ), it follows that for every ϕ ∈ W , Hdl(Q,Q),I (ϕ) =
I (ϕ)= t. Thus, let us consider a default
d = α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
from D. Let us assume that
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(i) for every J ∈Q, J (α)= t, and
(ii) for every i , 1 i  k, there is Ji ∈Q such that Ji(βi)= t
(if any of these two assumptions does not hold, we obtain right away Hdl(Q,Q),I (d) = t).
From (i), it follows that α ∈ YQ. Furthermore, (ii) and the definition of YQ imply that for
every i , 1  i  k, YQ  βi . Consequently, d is YQ-applicable and, by the definition of
Γ w∆ (YQ), we get that γ ∈ Γ w∆ (YQ). Hence, I (γ )= t and Hdl(Q,Q),I (d)= t.
We proved that I ∈Q. That is, we have that{
I ∈A: I (ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈ Γ w∆ (YQ)
}⊆Q.
By the definition of YQ, we have that for every I ∈ Q and for every ϕ ∈ YQ, I (ϕ) = t.
Consequently,
Q⊆ {I ∈A: I (ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈ YQ}.
Thus,{
I ∈A: I (ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈ Γ w∆ (YQ)
}⊆ {I ∈A: I (ϕ)= t for every ϕ ∈ YQ}
or, equivalently, YQ ⊆ Γ w∆ (YQ) (this last step depends on the fact that YQ and Γ w∆ (YQ) are
closed under propositional provability).
The second part of the assertion can be proved by means of a similar argument and so
we omit it. ✷
The key property of the operator E∆ is its pr -monotonicity. In particular, E∆ has a
least fixpoint. We call it the Kripke–Kleene fixpoint or Kripke–Kleene expansion of ∆.
We denote it by KK(∆). We refer to the corresponding semantics as the Kripke–Kleene
semantics for ∆.
As in the case of the autoepistemic logic, the Kripke–Kleene semantics approximates
the skeptical reasoning with partial expansions and provides a test for uniqueness of a
partial expansion. Indeed, we have the following corollary4 to Propositions 5.2, 3.5 and
3.6. This result is a counterpart to Corollary 3.10.
Corollary 5.4. Let ∆ be a default theory.
(1) The fixpoint KK(∆) is consistent.
(2) For every partial expansion B of ∆, KK(∆)pr B .
(3) For every partial expansion B of ∆,
kn
(
KK(∆)
)⊆ kn(B) and ig(KK(∆))⊆ ig(B).
(4) If KK(∆) is a complete belief pair, then it is a unique consistent partial expansion of∆.
Moreover the possible-world structure P such that KK(∆) = (P,P ) is the unique
expansion of ∆.
4 As a matter of fact, the proof of part (3) requires additional arguments. However, it is easy to derive this
claim from Corollary 3.10 and Theorem 6.3, proved in the next section. Thus, we omit the direct argument here.
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So far we have not yet reconstructed the concept of an extension. In order to do so, we
will now derive from E∆ two other operators related to default logic. Let us consider a
belief pair (P,S). We want to revise it to a belief pair (P ′, S′). We might do it by fixing S
and taking for P ′ a preferred revision of P , and by fixing P and taking for S′ a preferred
revision of S.
It is easy to see that pr -monotonicity of E∆ implies that the operator E l∆(·, S) is -
monotone operator on W . Consequently, it has a least fixpoint. This fixpoint can be taken
as the preferred way to revise P given S. Thus, we define
Est∆(S)= lfp
(E l∆(·, S)).
As in the case of autoepistemic logic, one can see that Est∆ also specifies the preferred
way to revise S given P . Combining these two revisions, we define the operator on B as
follows:
Est∆ (P,S)=
(
Est∆(S),E
st
∆(P )
)
.
The operator Est∆ describes a way to revise belief pairs.
We start our discussion of the properties of the operatorsEst∆ and Est∆ with the following
straightforward result relating their fixpoints.
Proposition 5.5. Let ∆ be a default theory. For every possible-world structure P , P is a
fixpoint of Est∆ if and only if (P,P ) is a fixpoint of Est∆ .
The operatorEst∆ allows us to reconstruct the notion of an extension as defined by Reiter.
Namely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. Let ∆ be a default theory. If a possible-world structure Q is a fixpoint of Est∆
then the theoryE = {ϕ ∈ L: I (ϕ)= t, for every I ∈Q} is an extension of∆. Conversely, if
a theory E is an extension of ∆ then Q= {I ∈A: I (ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈E} is a fixpoint
of Est∆ .
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 5.3. Let us recall that we proved there
the first assertion (a counterpart of the first assertion of the present theorem) and omitted
the proof of the second statement. Here we proceed the other way around. We omit the
proof of the first assertion and provide an argument for the second assertion only.
In the proof, we will use the concept of a generating default [21,28]. Let E be a theory
closed under propositional consequence. A default d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
is generating for E if
α ∈ E and for every i , 1  i  k, ¬βi /∈ E. Extensions can be characterized by means of
generating defaults. Namely, we have the following result [28]: if E is an extension of a
default theory (D,W) then
E = Cn(W ∪CGDE), (2)
where CGDE is the set of the consequents of all those defaults in D that are generating for
E.
Let us consider an extensionE of a default theory∆ (we will assume that ∆= (D,W)).
We define Q = {I ∈ A: I (ϕ) = t, for every ϕ ∈E} (in other words, Q is the set of all
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models of E). Since E is closed under propositional provability,
E = {ϕ ∈L: I (ϕ)= t, for every I ∈Q}.
Therefore, to prove the second assertion it suffices to show that Q= Est∆(Q). To this end
we will prove thatQ is the least fixpoint of the operator E l∆(·,Q). We will do so by showing
that Q is a pre-fixpoint of E l∆(·,Q) (that is, satisfies E l∆(Q,Q)  Q) and that for any
fixpoint Q′ of the operator E l∆(·,Q), QQ′.
We will first prove that E l∆(Q,Q)Q. Let us recall that
E l∆(Q,Q)=
{
I ∈A: Hdl(Q,Q),I (∆)= t
}
.
Let us consider a valuation I ∈Q. Since E is an extension of (D,W), W ⊆ E. Thus, for
every ϕ ∈W , Hdl(Q,Q),I (ϕ)= I (ϕ) = t. Next, let us consider a default d = α:β1,...,βkγ from
D. If d is a generating default for E, then γ ∈E and I (γ )= t. Thus,Hdl
(Q,Q),I
(d)= t. If d
is not a generating default or E, then either we have (1) α /∈E, or (2) there is i , 1 i  k,
such that J (βi) = f, for every J ∈Q. In either case, it follows that Hdl(Q,Q),I (d) = t, as
well. Consequently,Hdl(Q,Q),I (∆)= t and I ∈ E l∆(Q,Q). Thus, we get Q⊆ E l∆(Q,Q), or
equivalently E l∆(Q,Q)Q.
Let us now consider a fixpoint Q′ of E l∆(·,Q) and let us define
E′ = {ϕ ∈ L: I (ϕ)= t, for every I ∈Q′}.
Clearly, E′ is closed under propositional provability. Since Q′ is a fixpoint of E l∆(·,Q),
Q′ = E l∆(Q′,Q)=
{
I ∈A: Hdl(Q,Q′),I (∆)= t
}
.
Thus, for every ϕ ∈W and for every I ∈Q′, I (ϕ)= t. In other words, W ⊆ E′. Next, let
us consider a default d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
from D. Let us assume that α ∈E′ and that for every i ,
1 i  k, E  ¬βi . It follows that for every J ∈Q′, J (α)= t and, since E is closed under
propositional provability, that for every i , 1  i  k, there is Ji ∈Q such that Ji(βi)= t.
Let I ∈Q′. Since Hdl
(Q,Q′),I (d)= t, it follows that I (γ )= t. Thus, γ ∈E′.
We have just proved that E′ satisfies the three requirements from the definition of
Γ∆(E). Thus, E = Γ∆(E) ⊆ E′. Consequently, Q′ ⊆ Q or, equivalently, Q  Q′. We
proved thatQ is a pre-fixpoint of E l∆(·,Q) and thatQQ′ for any fixpointQ′ of E l∆(·,Q).
It follows that Q is the least fixpoint of E l∆(·,Q) ✷
In view of Theorem 5.6, we refer to the fixpoints of the operatorEst∆ as extensions of ∆.
Further, in view of Proposition 5.5, we call fixpoints of the operator Est∆ , partial extensions
of ∆. One can show that consistent partial extensions of a default theory ∆ are in one-to-
one correspondence with stationary extensions of ∆ defined in [26].
We also note that the operator Est∆ coincides with the operator Σ∆ defined on sets
of interpretations and proposed by Guerreiro and Casanova [14,18,21]. Guerreiro and
Casanova simply rephrased the original definition of the operator Γ∆ (which works on
theories and can be restricted, without the loss of generality, to theories closed under
propositional provability) in terms of sets of interpretations (possible-world structures) that
are models of such theories. One of our contributions is that we derive this operator in a
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systematic and purely algebraic (thus, not relying on any particular properties of defaults)
fashion from an operator E∆ defined on the lattice of belief pairs.
Our next result describes monotonicity properties of the operators Est∆ and Est∆ . It is
analogous to Theorem 4.2 and can be proved in the same way.
Theorem 5.7. Let ∆ be a default theory. Then, the operator Est∆ is -antimonotone and
the operator Est∆ is pr -monotone and symmetric.
Theorem 5.7 implies that the operator Est∆ has a least fixpoint. We will denote it by
WF(∆) and refer to it as the well-founded fixpoint (or the well-founded extension) of ∆.
We will call the semantics it implies the well-founded semantics of ∆. One can show that
the well-founded semantics of∆, as we introduced it here, coincides with the well-founded
semantics of default logic introduced in [2].
The well-founded semantics allows us to approximate skeptical reasoning with
extensions and yields a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of an extension. As before,
the following result is a simple corollary to the fact that Est∆ is symmetric and pr -
monotone (Theorem 5.7), and to Propositions 3.5 and 3.6. We also note that, as in the
case of Corollary 5.4, part (3) of the assertion requires additional arguments and can be
derived, for instance, from Corollary 4.3 and Theorem 6.3.
Corollary 5.8. Let ∆ be a default theory.
(1) The fixpoint WF(∆) is consistent.
(2) For every partial extension B of ∆, WF(∆)pr B .
(3) For every partial extension B of ∆,
kn
(
WF(T )
)⊆ kn(B) and ig(WF(T ))⊆ ig(B).
(4) If WF(T ) is a complete belief pair, then it is the unique consistent partial extension
of ∆. Moreover the possible-world structure P such that WF(T ) = (P,P ) is the
unique extension of ∆.
Finally, let us note connections between (partial) expansions and (partial) extensions,
and between the Kripke–Kleene and well-founded semantics for default logic. The proof
of this result follows closely the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 5.9. Let ∆ be a default theory. Then:
(1) KK(∆)pr WF(∆).
(2) Every extension of ∆ is a -minimal expansion of ∆.
(3) Every partial extension (P,S) of ∆ is a -minimal partial expansions of ∆: for every
partial expansions (P ′, S′), if P ′  P and S′  S, then P = P ′ and S = S′.
In summary, default logic can be viewed as the logic of the operator E∆. That is,
the fixpoints of E∆ define the semantics of partial expansions. The least fixpoint of E∆
defines the Kripke–Kleene fixpoint. The operator E∆ gives rise to the operator E∆, whose
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expansions (weak extensions) 
partial expansions
Kripke–Kleene fixpoint

E∆
E∆
partial extensions
well-founded semantics
 Default logic of Reiter
extensions

Est∆
Est∆





Fig. 5. Operators associated with default logic.
fixpoints are expansions (also referred to as weak extensions). Kripke–Kleene semantics
provides an approximation for the skeptical reasoning under the semantics of expansions.
The operator E∆ also leads to the operator Est∆ . Consistent fixpoints of this operator yield
partial extensions (stationary extensions in the terminology of [26]). Fixpoints of the
related operator Est∆ correspond to extensions by Reiter. The least fixpoint of the operator
Est∆ results in the well-founded semantics for default logic and approximates the skeptical
reasoning under the semantics of extensions. The relationships between the operators of
default logic are illustrated in Fig. 5. They are parallel to those for the autoepistemic logic
(Fig. 4).
6. Default logic versus autoepistemic logic
The results of this paper shed new light on the relationship between default and
autoepistemic logics. The nature of this relationship was the subject of extensive
investigations since the time both systems were introduced in the early 1980s. Konolige
[16] proposed to encode a default d = α:β1,...,βk
γ
by the modal formula
m(d)=Kα ∧¬K¬β1 ∧ · · ·¬K¬βk ⇒ γ,
and to represent a default theory ∆= (D,W) by a modal theory
m(∆)=W ∪ {m(d): d ∈D}.
Despite the fact that the encoding is intuitive it does not provide a correspondence between
default logic as defined by Reiter and autoepistemic logic as defined by Moore. Let us
consider a default theory ∆ with W = ∅ and D = {p:q
p
}, where p and q are two different
atoms. Then∆ has exactly one extension, Cn(∅). Applying the translation of Konolige to ∆
yields the theory m(∆)= {Kp∧¬K¬q⇒ p}. The theory m(∆) has two expansions. One
of them is generated by the theory Cn(∅) (equivalently, it is the possible-world structureA)
and corresponds to the only extension of ∆. The other expansion is generated by the theory
Cn({p}) (equivalently, it is the possible-world structure that consists of just one valuation
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of {p,q}, the one in which p is true and q is false). Thus, the Konolige’s translation
does not give a one-to-one correspondence between extensions of default theories and
expansions of their modal encodings. Another example can be obtained from the default
theory ∆= (D,W) where W = ∅, and D = {p:
p
} (yielding the modal theory {Kp⇒ p}
that we used as a running example). Our concept of extension of an autoepistemic theory
eliminated the unwanted expansion of ∆, leaving only the desired modal theory that
corresponds to Reiter’s extension.
This mismatch can now be explained within the semantic framework introduced in
this paper. Konolige’s translation does not establish a correspondence between extensions
and expansions because they are associated with different operators. Expansions are
associated with fixpoints of the operator DT . Its counterpart on the side of default logic
is the operator E∆. Fixpoints of this operator are not extensions but expansions (weak
extensions, in the terminology of [19]) of ∆. Extensions of ∆ are associated with the
operator Est∆ . Its counterpart on the side of autoepistemic logic is the operator D
st
T ,
introduced in Section 4. This operator, to the best of our knowledge, has not appeared
in the literature.
In this section, we show that once we properly align concepts from default logic with
those from autoepistemic logic, Konolige’s translation works! This alignment is illustrated
in Fig. 6 and is formally described by Theorem 6.3. To prove it, we will need the following
lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Let (P,S) be a belief pair. For every interpretation I ∈A and every default
d we have
Hdl(P ,S),I (d)=H2(P ,S),I
(
m(d)
)
.
Proof. Let us assume that
d = α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
.
The modal translation m(d) of d can be equivalently written as
¬Kα ∨K¬β1 ∨ · · · ∨K¬βk ∨ γ.
We now show the desired equality.
E∆
E∆ E
st
∆
Est∆





DT
DT D
st
T
Dst
T





α:β
γ → Kα ∧¬K¬β⇒ γ
Fig. 6. Embedding default logic into autoepistemic logic.
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Hdl(P ,S),I )(d)= f if and only if the following three conditions hold:
(1) For every J ∈ S, J (α) = f.
(2) For every i , 1 i  k, there exists J ∈ P , J (βi) = f.
(3) I (γ ) = t.
These three conditions are equivalent to the conjunction of the following three conditions:
(1) H2(P ,S),I (¬Kα)= f.
(2) For every i , 1 i  k, H2(P ,S),I (K¬βi)= f.
(3) H2(P ,S),I (γ )= f.
This latter set of conditions is equivalent to H2(P ,S),I (m(d))= f. Thus, Hdl(P ,S),I )(d)= f if
and only if H2(P ,S),I (m(d))= f, and the argument is complete. ✷
Corollary 6.2. Let ∆= (D,W) be a default theory. Then, for every belief pair (P,S),{
I : Hdl(P ,S),I (∆)= t
}= {I : H2(P ,S),I(m(∆))= t}.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.3. Let ∆ be a default theory and let T = m(∆). Then the following pairs of
operators coincide and, thus, have the same fixpoints:
(1) E∆ = DT (partial expansions for ∆ and T , including Kripke–Kleene fixpoints,
coincide).
(2) E∆ =DT (expansions for ∆ and T coincide).
(3) Est∆ =DstT (extensions for ∆ and T coincide).
(4) Est∆ = DstT (partial extensions for ∆ and T , including the well-founded fixpoints,
coincide).
Proof. (1) By Corollary 6.2, E∆ =Dm(∆).
(2) We recall that E∆(P) = Q if and only if E∆(P,P ) = (Q,Q). By (1), this is
equivalent to Dm(∆)(P,P )= (Q,Q), that is, Dm(∆)(P )=Q. Thus, E∆ =Dm(∆).
(3) Since E∆ =Dm(∆), we have, for every possible-world structure S,
E l∆(·, S)=Dlm(∆)(·, S).
Therefore, for each S,
lfp(E l∆(·, S))= lfp(Dlm(∆)(·, S)).
But this just means that Est∆ =Dstm(∆).
(4) This assertion follows immediately from (3) as DstT (P,S) = (DstT (S),DstT (P )) and,
likewise, Est∆(P,S)= (Est∆(S),Est∆(P )). ✷
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7. Computing the well-founded semantics
In this section we discuss methods to compute Kripke–Kleene and well-founded
fixpoints. We will focus on the case of autoepistemic logic. Since, as we demonstrated
in the previous section, default logic can be viewed as a fragment of autoepistemic logic,
our methods and results will apply to default logic, as well.
To computeDlT (P,S) we need to compute all interpretations I such thatH2(P ,S),I (ϕ)=
t for every ϕ ∈ T . The number of such interpretations may be exponential in the number of
atoms in T . The key to our approach is a simple observation that these interpretations are
determined by some propositional theory of much smaller size. Indeed, the logical values
of modal atoms (formulas of the formKψ) occurring in ϕ do not depend on I . In particular,
the logical values of maximal modal atoms (modal atoms not within the scope of any other
occurrence of the modal operator) are determined by the belief pair (P,S). Once these
values are established, we substitute them for the corresponding modal atoms. In this way,
we obtain a formula, say ϕ(P,S), in the propositional language with two special symbols
t and f that represent truth and falsity, respectively. These special symbols are interpreted
in a standard way (in fact, we use the same notation for these two special elements of the
language as for the corresponding truth values). We denote this language by Le . The key
property of the formula ϕ(P,S) is that H2(P ,S),I (ϕ) = t if and only if I (ϕ(P,S)) = t. Thus,
the set of interpretations DlT (P,S) is represented by the set of formulas {ϕ(P,S): ϕ ∈ T }.
A similar representation can be obtained for the set DuT (P,S). This leads to two questions:
(1) how to compute these representations, and (2) how to use them instead of belief pairs
in the process of computing the operator D and other related operators. The rest of this
section is devoted to these issues.
For every interpretation I ∈A, we define an interpretation I e of Le by setting I e(t)= t,
I e(f)= f, I e(p)= I (p) for every atom p in L, and by extending it to the whole language
Le in the standard way. For a theory X⊆ Le , we define
Mod(X)= {I ∈A: I e(ϕ)= t, for every ϕ ∈X}.
Let W be a possible-world structure. We call each propositional theory X ⊆ Le such that
Mod(X)=W , a representation ofW . Similarly, given a belief pair (P,S), a pair of theories
(X,Y ) such that Mod(X) = P and Mod(Y ) = S is called a representation of (P,S). We
extend the notation Mod to pairs of theories and define Mod(X,Y )= (Mod(X),Mod(Y )).
Let X and Y be two theories in the language Le . For every modal formula ϕ ∈ LK we
define a formula ϕ(X,Y ) ∈ Le by induction as follows:
(1) If ϕ is modal-free, ϕ(X,Y ) = ϕ.
(2) If ϕ =¬ψ , ϕ(X,Y ) =¬ψ(Y,X) (one should note that X and Y are reversed on the right
hand side).
(3) If ϕ =ψ ′ ∨ψ ′′, ϕ(X,Y ) =ψ ′(X,Y ) ∨ψ ′′(X,Y ).
(4) If ϕ =ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′, ϕ(X,Y ) =ψ ′(X,Y ) ∧ψ ′′(X,Y ).
(5) If ϕ =Kψ , ϕ(X,Y ) = t if X ψ(X,Y ). Otherwise, ϕ(X,Y ) = f.
Next, for a modal theory T we define
T(X,Y ) = {ϕ(X,Y ): ϕ ∈ T }.
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It is easy to see that the inductive definition given above yields an algorithm to compute
ϕ(X,Y ). If we count each call to the propositional provability oracle as one step (the input
for each such call is given by X or Y and a subformula of ϕ), then this algorithm runs in
polynomial time in the size of ϕ. Since the input for each call to the oracle is formed by
one of X or Y and a subformula of ϕ, it follows that the problem to compute ϕ(X,Y ), given
a modal formula ϕ and a pair of theories (X,Y ), is in the class 2P .
Our algorithm to compute the Kripke–Kleene and well-founded semantics for autoepis-
temic and default logics is based on the following result.
Theorem 7.1. For every belief pair (P,S) and every propositional theories X and Y in the
extended language, if Mod(X,Y )= (P,S), then
DT (P,S)=Mod(T(Y,X), T(X,Y )).
Proof. We will first show that for every belief pair (P,S), every two propositional theories
X and Y (in the extended language), every modal formula ϕ and every interpretation I ∈A,
H2(P ,S),I (ϕ)= I e(ϕ(X,Y )). (3)
We proceed by induction on the length of ϕ. The claim is evident in the case when
ϕ ∈ L (this case establishes, in particular, the basis for the induction). Let us assume that
ϕ =¬ψ . Then,
H2(P ,S),I (ϕ)=¬H2(S,P ),I (ψ)=¬I e(ψ(Y,X))= I e(¬ψ(Y,X))= I e(ϕ(X,Y ))
(the second equality is implied by the induction hypothesis, the last one follows from the
inductive definition of ϕ(X,Y )). A similar reasoning establishes the inductive step for the
cases when the main connective in ϕ is the disjunction or the conjunction.
The last case to consider is that of ϕ =Kψ . Let us assume that H2(P ,S),I (ϕ)= t. Then,
H2(P ,S),J (ψ)= t for every J ∈ P . By the induction hypothesis we obtain that J e(ψ(X,Y ))=
t for every J ∈ P . Since Mod(X) = P , it follows that X  ψ(X,Y ). Thus, ϕ(X,Y ) = t and
I e(ϕ(X,Y )) = t. Conversely, let us assume that I e(ϕ(X,Y ))= t. Since ϕ = Kψ , ϕ(X,Y ) = t
or f. The latter case is impossible as I e(ϕ(X,Y )) = t. Thus, ϕ(X,Y ) = t. It follows that
X  ψ(X,Y ). Since Mod(X) = P , for every interpretation J ∈ P , J e(ψ(X,Y )) = t. By
the induction hypothesis, for every interpretation J ∈ P , H2(P ,S),J (ψ) = t. Thus, by
the definition of the function H2(P ,S),I , H2(P ,S),I (ϕ) = t. This completes our inductive
argument.
We will use (3) to prove the assertion of the theorem. We have
DlT (P,S)=
{
I : H2(S,P ),I (T )= t
}= {I : I e(T(Y,X))= t}=Mod(T(Y,X)).
Similarly,
DuT (P,S)=
{
I : H2(P ,S),I (T )= t
}= {I : I e(T(X,Y ))= t}=Mod(T(X,Y )).
Thus, the assertion follows. ✷
Let us define an operator on pairs of theories from Le by
ST (X,Y )= (T(Y,X), T(X,Y )).
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Directly from Theorem 7.1, it follows that for every pair (X,Y ) of propositional theories
in the extended language we have:
DT
(
Mod(X,Y )
)=Mod(ST (X,Y )). (4)
Before we state the next corollary, which is the key to our complexity results, we
introduce additional notation. Let L be a set, and let O :L→ L be an operator in L.
The iterations of the operator O , 〈O↑n〉n∈N are defined inductively as follows. O↑0 is
the identity operator in L. When O↑n is defined, O↑n+1 is defined by the condition:
O↑n+1(x)=O(O↑n(x)).
We now have the following corollary.
Corollary 7.2. Let T be a modal theory. For every n 0,
DT↑n(A,∅)=Mod
(ST↑n({t}, {f})).
Proof. Clearly, A = Mod(t) and ∅ = Mod(f). Thus, the assertion holds for n= 0. Let us
consider an integer n 0 and assume that the assertion holds for n. We have
DT↑n+1(A,∅)=DT
(DT↑n(A,∅))=DT (Mod(ST↑n({t}, {f})))
(the second equality follows by the induction hypothesis). Now, by (4),
DT
(
Mod
(ST↑n({t}, {f})))=Mod(ST (ST↑n({t}, {f})))=Mod(ST↑n+1({t}, {f})).
Thus, the assertion follows by induction. ✷
Corollary 7.2 implies an algorithm to compute the Kripke–Kleene expansion (fixpoint)
for a modal theory T . Since the operator DT is pr -monotone, this fixpoint (which is
the least fixpoint of DT ) can be computed by iterating DT over the belief pair (A,∅). By
Corollary 7.2, this fixpoint (or, more precisely, a pair of theories that represents it) can be
computed by iterating the operator ST over the pair of theories ({t}, {f}).
The number of iterations necessary to compute the least fixpoint ofDT (or, equivalently,
ST ) is polynomial in the size of T . Indeed, by the monotonicity of DT , the sequence of
sets Bi =DT↑i (A,∅) is ascending, that is,
B0 pr B1 pr B2 pr · · · .
Moreover, by Proposition 3.5, all Bis are consistent. Thus, by Proposition 3.2, for every
modal atom Kψ of T we have
H4B0(Kψ)pr H4B1(Kψ)pr H4B2(Kψ)pr · · · .
After no more that 2k iterations, where k is the number of maximal modal atoms in T ,
this latter sequence stabilizes (reaches its limit). Indeed, each modal atom can change its
value at most twice (from f to u or i and, then, one more time to t). By Proposition 3.8 it
follows that if no modal atoms change their values when moving from Bi to Bi+1, then
Bi+1 = Bi+2. Thus, B2k+1 = B2k+2.
We have already argued before that the task to compute a single iteration of the operator
ST is in the class 2P . Thus, we obtain the following result.
M. Denecker et al. / Artificial Intelligence 143 (2003) 79–122 117
Theorem 7.3. The problem of computing the Kripke–Kleene fixpoint for a given finite
modal theory T is in the class 2P .
This result was first proved in [7]. The method we presented here is a simplification
of the approach from [7]. Moreover, we will now extend it to the case of computing the
well-founded fixpoint of a modal theory T .
In order to compute the well-founded fixpoint of T we need to design techniques
to compute the stable operator DstT . Let us recall that DstT (P,S) = (DstT (S),DstT (P )),
where DstT (S) = lfp(DS,T ) (we recall that DS,T = DT (·, S)). Thus, we will first focus on
computing the operator DstT .
Let Y be a theory in the language Le. For every theory X ⊆ Le , we define
SY,T (X)= T(Y,X).
Theorem 7.1 has the following corollary concerning the connection between the operators
DS,T and SY,T (the proof is straightforward and we omit it).
Corollary 7.4. Let T be a modal theory, let P and S be possible-world structures and
let X and Y be theories in Le . If P = Mod(X) and S = Mod(Y ), then DS,T (P ) =
Mod(SY,T (X)).
It follows from Corollary 7.4 that the possible-world structure DstT (S) (or, to be
precise, its representation) can be computed by iterating the operator SY,T , where Y is
a representation of S.
Corollary 7.5. Let T be a modal theory. For every possible-world structure S and every
theory Y ⊆ Le, if S =Mod(Y ), then for every n 0,
DS,T↑n(A)=Mod
(
SY,T↑n
({t})).
Proof. We proceed by induction. Since
DS,T↑0(A)=A=Mod
({t})=Mod(SY,T↑0({t})),
the case n= 0 is settled. Let us assume that the assertion holds for all integers smaller than
or equal to some integer n 0. We will show that the assertion holds for n+ 1. Indeed,
DS,T↑n+1(A) = DS,T
(
DS,T↑n(A)
)=DS,T (Mod(SY,T↑n({t})))
= Mod(SY,T (SY,T↑n({t})))=Mod(SY,T↑n+1({t})).
The second equality follows by the induction hypothesis, the third one is implied by
Corollary 7.4. ✷
The sequence DS,T ↑n(A) is ascending and it stabilizes after no more than 2k + 1
iterations, where k is the number of maximal modal atoms occurring in T (a similar
argument as the one we used for DT ↑n(A,∅) works in this case, as well). Thus, the
sequence SY,T↑n({t}) stabilizes after no more than 2k + 1 iterations, too. Let us denote
this limit by SstT (Y ).
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The problem of computing the value SY,T (X) is in the class 2P (it follows from our
earlier remarks on the complexity of computing ST ). Thus, it follows from Corollary 7.5
that we can compute SstT (Y ) (which is a representation of the possible-world structure
Dst (S)) by iterating the operator SY,T (where Y is a representation of S). Since the number
of iterations is polynomial in the size of T and Y , the task of computing (a representation
of) Dst (S) is in 2P (assuming that S is given in terms of its representation Y ).
For a pair of theories (X,Y ) in the language Le , we define
SstT (X,Y )=
(
SstT (Y ), S
st
T (X)
)
.
Let us consider possible-world structures P and S and theories X and Y in Le such that
P =Mod(X) and S =Mod(Y ). Then, by Corollary 7.4,
Dst (P,S)= (DstT (S),DstT (P ))= (Mod(SstT (Y ),Mod(SstT (X))))=Mod(SstT (X,Y )).
It follows, that the problem of computing a representation ofDst (P,S) (that is, SstT (X,Y )),
given representations X and Y of P and S, respectively, is in the class 2P .
The well-founded fixpoint ofDst can be computed by iterating the operatorDst starting
with the belief pair (A,∅). Our discussion implies that its representation can be computed
by iterating the operator Sst and starting with the pair of theories ({t}, {f}). The number of
iterations is bounded by 2k+ 1, where k is the number of maximal modal atoms occurring
in T (the same argument as in the case of the Kripke–Kleene fixpoint computations
applies). Thus, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 7.6. The problem of computing the well-founded fixpoint for a given finite modal
theory T is in the class 2P .
We proved in the previous section that default theories can be translated into equivalent
modal theories (Theorem 6.3). Thus, Theorems 7.3 and 7.6 have the following corollary.
Corollary 7.7. The problem to compute the Kripke–Kleene fixpoint (respectively, the well-
founded fixpoint) for a given default theory ∆ is in the class 2P .
The problem to decide whether a default theory ∆ has an expansion (respectively,
extension) is complete for the class 22P . The problem to compute an expansion
(extension) for ∆ is 22P -hard. These results were obtained by Gottlob [12] and,
independently, by Stillman [31]. The corresponding problems concerning expansions
and extensions of autoepistemic theories have the same complexity [12]. Theorems 7.3
and 7.6 and Corollary 7.7 indicate that the complexity of the problems to compute
Kripke–Kleene and well-founded fixpoints of autoepistemic and default theories have
lower complexity (assuming the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse). Thus, these
approximation semantics are computationally more attractive than the semantics of (two-
valued) expansions and extensions.
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8. Discussion and future work
We presented results uncovering the semantic properties of default and autoepistemic
logics. For each logic, we introduced an operator describing how to revise belief
pairs when constructing belief sets, and derived from this operator a whole family of
semantics. We obtained these semantics by purely algebraic transformations reflecting
basic principles of approximating belief sets. Some of these semantics (Kripke–Kleene
and well-founded semantics) have a constructive flavor and are more amenable to
computational treatment.
We also demonstrated that the modal interpretation of defaults proposed by Konolige
establishes a perfect correspondence between the families of semantics of default and
autoepistemic logics. This elegant picture can be further extended to the case of logic
programming with negation. Based on the work of Fitting[10], it was shown in [9]
that all key semantics for logic programs can be similarly obtained from the four-
valued operator TP generalizing the original van Emden–Kowalski one-step provability
operator TP [33]. The resulting structure of main semantics of logic programs is shown in
Fig. 7.
The operator TP is a counterpart to the operators DT and E∆. Indeed, the translation
of logic program clauses into default rules proposed in [5,20] establishes an embedding
of logic programming into default logic that precisely aligns the corresponding semantics
(Fig. 8).
Let us further note that the approach to semantics of nonmonotonic logics based on
the concept of a belief pair can also be extended to the case of reflexive autoepistemic
logic introduced by Schwarz [29]. As in all other cases discussed in this paper, all
major semantics for the reflexive autoepistemic logic can be obtained from a single
operator on the lattice B (the definition of the operator remains essentially the same as
in the case of autoepistemic logic—what changes is the definition of the truth function
H4(P ,S),I ).
As pointed in the Section 1, in early 80s, McDermott and Doyle proposed a general
approach to define modal nonmonotonic logics [22,23]. It is known that autoepistemic
supported models 
partial supported models
Kripke-Kleene fixpoint

TP
TP
partial stable models
well-founded semantics
stable models

T st
P
T st
P






Fig. 7. Operators associated with logic programming.
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TP
TP T
st
P
T st
P





E∆
E∆ E
st
∆
Est∆





p← q,not(r) → q:¬rp
Fig. 8. Embedding logic programming in default logic.
logic can be obtained within the framework of McDermott and Doyle from the modal logic
KD45 [21,30]. In [29] Schwarz proved that reflexive autoepistemic logic can similarly
be obtained from modal logic SW5. Our results show that both logics can be given an
algebraic treatment based on the concept of a belief pair. An interesting question is whether
other modal nonmonotonic logics in the McDermott and Doyle’s scheme are amenable to
such an approach.
Another question concerning the McDermott and Doyle’s scheme is whether the
semantics of extensions for autoepistemic logic can be reconstructed within it as a modal
nonmonotonic logic corresponding to some appropriately chosen underlying modal logic.
The answer to this question is negative. The modal theory T , where
T = {¬Kp⇒ p, Kp⇒ p},
has no extensions. The easiest way to see it is to observe that T =m(∆), where
∆=
(
∅,
{
p :
p
,
: ¬p
p
})
.
Since ∆ has no extensions, Theorem 6.3 implies that m(T ) has no extensions either.
However, for every modal logic S , T has at least one S-expansion (in the sense of
McDermott and Doyle). In particular, the set of consequences of {p} in the logic S5 is
such an expansion [21].
Finally, let us mention that it is possible to develop an abstract, purely algebraic
treatment of the concept of an approximation of an operator. It generalizes the approach
presented here and the work of Fitting on logic programming semantics. An account of
this abstract treatment of approximations can be found in [8].
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